

AND NOW CHINA

INSIDE STORY OF SOVIET DESIGNS ON CHINA

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PREFACE

I have great pleasure in placing before the public this third book in the "Un-Pacific Series".

The enormous popularity enjoyed by my first two books in this series, *Where Will Japan Move Next*, and *The Secret of China's Resistance*, encourages me to hope that his third in the series also will be accepted with the same indulgence, despite a few points here and there contained in the book, which are likely to evoke criticism. The object of the author herein is to discuss the subject frankly and unreservedly, without attaching any undue importance to personalities and ideologies. There is no intention whatsoever to offend anyone, and no malice is meant here. The views expressed are based upon information obtained from various sources intimately connected with the conditions in China and on the personal observation of the author. Difference of opinion is possible, is indeed inevitable, but it is only by such difference of opinion that truth will be arrived at. The intentions of the author are sincere and genuine and in no case actuated by any personal motives. It is hoped that the problem will be viewed from this point of view.

I have made a little variation in the order of the books in this series. As announced before, the third book in the series should have been *The Pacific Realm*. But it became increasingly difficult during these war times to obtain correct and latest information about the vast subject, and the work had to be postponed to a later date. In the meantime, I have placed this book in the series.

For ten continuous years, it had been my fate to be in the embattled arena of the Sino-Japanese front, where the study of the Pacific and the Far Eastern problems had been my daily business. The facts are therefore interpreted in terms of my own observation on the spot during the ten most exciting years (1931-1941) that have destroyed the pacifism of the Pacific Ocean. However, I do not claim myself to be an "expert" or "authority" on the subject, although I was not merely a "cold weather" visitor to the Far East. I am just a student of the Pacific Affairs.

In this Series, I intend to explain the position involved in important problems concerning the Pacific conflict. I call the Series "Un-Pacific" because the Pacific Ocean has become unpacific, and the books or booklets in the series will deal with those problems which have made the Ocean "Un-Pacific" unlike its name.

I am indebted to all the authors quoted in this book as well as to others whom I may have unwittingly followed though not actually quoted.

Bombay,

K. B. VAIDYA.

AND NOW CHINA

INSIDE STORY OF SOVIET DESIGNS ON CHINA

Mr. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, returns to London after conference with Stalin in Moscow (November 1944). Immediately after, *Daily Express* takes up propaganda against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek originally started by Stalin's *Pravda*. Overnight Chiang ceases to be a *persona grata*. He ceases to be the leader of China. Henceforward the focus is upon the Big Three. The fourth one has been dropped for good. China itself ceases to be a great power—one of the four Great Powers until yesterday with America, Britain and Russia. America gets cool towards Chiang. Chiang wants recall of General Stilwell, the American Chief-of-Staff of the American and Chinese forces operating in Yunnan and Burma. Stilwell is recalled to America. And yet another American Major-General (Wademeyr) takes Stilwell's place. Americans also begin to think that Chiang is not the leader of China. China does not appear to them a Great Power. Earlier, American and other foreign correspondents in China, who might have enjoyed the hospitality of the Chinese people and Government, help to bring Chiang down from the high pedestal by mortgaging him to Chen Brothers. They now look at the conditions in China from a different angle. American Vice-President, Henry Wallace, visited Chungking and reports to President Roosevelt on the situation in China. A Canadian Government representative, it is reported, considers Stilwell as being impossible to work with and

his departure would smooth out matters. The cause of the dispute between Chiang and Stilwell is said to be the desire of the latter to have full control over the entire Chinese Army to which Chiang would not agree. Another probable reason given out later is that Stilwell was flirting with the Chinese Communists behind the back of Chiang. Fighting is reported to have ceased in China between the Chinese and the Japanese. And latest of all (November, 1944) Stalin labels Japan as an aggressor nation—this Sphinx who never uttered a word against Japan since September 15, 1939, that is, after his decision to conclude the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact.

And thus world attention is diverted from the worsening of the Anglo-American relations over Mr. Philip's report to President Roosevelt about India and the India issue.

Side by side the war news in the Pacific in November, 1944, was bewildering and confused. One day the whole Japanese fleet is destroyed near Philippines, and practically no American ships are even damaged. Next day, the Japanese fleet is reassembling for a renewed attack. Then in a small corner, news is published that several American ships are damaged in the battle. Formosa is bombed. Reconnaissance over Tokyo. Japanese main islands bombed. Japan said to be in the worst condition. Japan is in sight of certain defeat. Churchill and Stalin plan strategy of the Pacific. Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt are reported to meet soon. No mention of Chiang Kai-shek in that connection is made even when Pacific affairs are to be discussed. Chiang was present at the Cairo Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill, where Stalin was absent. Chiang was not present at the Teheran

Conference where Stalin was present, although Teheran happens to be exactly on the way back home for Chiang from Cairo to Chungking.

All these fast-changing moves on the Far Eastern political chessboard have left people completely bewildered. Everyone wonders what is the real state of affairs. Why and how suddenly the turn took place in China's fate? Is China making peace with Japan? Is China going to crumble? Has fighting actually ceased between China and Japan? Will China and Chiang Kai-shek be ignored at the Peace Conference? To what extent will Japan be humbled? What will be the relations between China and America, and between China and Britain? And between China and Russia, and China and Japan? These and similar questions have been uppermost in the popular mind all over the world more especially in the east, and people want solution. Clarification of the situation is needed. It is difficult to say precisely what is happening. Nevertheless many minds are set working on the whole problem. They are looking at it from different angles. What is then the real situation?

China

China !

That wonderland of the past and a Great Power of yesterday suffered a landslide in the twinkling of an eye. Who is the great magician or the villain? Roosevelt? Certainly not. Churchill? Possibly yes. Stalin? Certainly yes. Or, Stalin, Churchill and Co. with the sleeping partnership of Roosevelt?

Everything is possible? Politics and diplomacy have self-interest as their base. This guiding principle can achieve anything. It can change anything. For it people will sacrifice their best friends and throw to the winds any ideologies. What is therefore not possible? It happens even in the limited sphere of individual self-interest. How much more will it operate in state politics? Is not this self-interest possibly again at it? Let us see.

When the Sino-Japanese War started on September 18, 1931, all sympathies went to China. "China, a weak nation, is outraged". "China, the youngest Republic, is throttled in its infancy". "The Chinese are great people, inheritors of the ancientmost civilisation". "China yearning for democracy". "Chiang the masterful leader". Chinese ability must be supported to crush the ruthless aggression of Japan". These and similar phrases greeted Chinese efforts specially from American and British peoples and press. America specially was more vociferous in her avowal of sympathy for "poor" China. This had been the case even till yesterday. And yet today China is not a great power and Chiang is not the leader of China? Why and how?

Let us therefore first examine the conditions in China subjectively before answering this question.

In the first place, it is forgotten that it was China that kept Japan bogged in the country for the last 15 years. It was China, a weak and unequipped nation, that showed the way to the world how to fight a stronger power. China could have submitted to Japan and even made a reasonable treaty. But she resisted all such temptations and sacrificed all at the altar of freedom. So, it is China

that taught the world in most emphatic tones that freedom is the highest possession of man. No sacrifice is too great for it. No suffering is to be spared for it. Life without freedom is life without soul. It is China also that gave respite to America and Britain to prepare for their war against Japan and Germany. And what is more Americans at least could make money by selling goods to both the belligerents—China and Japan. And yet China and Chiang today are not in favour. They are in disgrace.

Now the main charges against Generalissimo (or, the abbreviated form, G'ssimo) Chiang and China are that Chiang is using his army to watch the Communists, Chiang has ceased fighting Japan, Chiang is fighting for preserving the power of a small family clique—the Soong Dynasty as it is popularly and jocularly called. The warlords have again become semi-independent and do not seem to be obeying orders of the Central Government. Consequently, the authority of the Central Government is not being respected in the country. Chiang's Government therefore ceases to be the Central Government of China, and Chiang ceases to be the leader of China. Consequently, China cannot be counted as a Great Power. Chiang cannot therefore be a "Big" one, and must be excluded from "Big Four".

But, I ask, when was China not in this state? There have been differences with the Communists almost all along excepting for a brief period in 1937 and 1938 when the Sino-Japanese War was being vigorously fought. Since then stalemate has occurred in China in that War. The provincial warlords have yet to be brought completely under control, and this stalemate has affected the

process. When vigorous fighting was on, progress towards this end was rapid. The tyranny of distances has to be removed from China to bring the warlords fully under control. This could be done by opening longer communications. These communications were being fast developed. Formerly there were about 15,000 trucks employed on the Burma Road alone for supplies. Now there are said to be hardly 5,000. Why? First because the road is closed, and secondly because no petrol and spare parts are available in China. The parts may be produced in China. But the steel and equipment necessary for producing them is not at present available in Free China. Nor is petrol. The Assam (Ledo) Road has not been so useful as the Burma Road, as the former passes over steep hills, and mules rather than lorries have to be employed for transportation in many parts of the road. Many roads are built and are being built in China. But want of vehicles and their parts, and petrol would naturally slow down development in the means of communication during war time. Therewith the process of curbing the provincial warlords and keeping them under control is likely to suffer temporary set-back. Both Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek had pinned their faith on the construction of 100,000 miles of railways and 1,000,000 miles of roads in China as the best means of achieving unity and for maintaining the authority of the Central Government in China. But this is yet to be achieved.

Besides, it should be noted that since the fall of Canton and Hankow in October, 1938, there has been no serious fighting in China. All fighting has been sporadic. The Japanese do not want to go much westward beyond the line drawn from Peiping in the north to Canton in the

south with Hankow in the centre. They have passed this line at two points, it is true, that is, up to Ichang from Hankow in the centre,—about 200 miles—and up to Loyang in the north. In my letter to the *Times of India*, Bombay, in May, 1944, I had stated that the Japanese would not go beyond Loyang owing to the most difficult terrain westward. They have not moved. And generally speaking, they are not willing to cross the line because the terrain westward is very difficult. They do not also want to stretch their lines further inside from the shore in such difficult parts of the country. They are already about 1,000 miles inside from the seashore, say, from Shanghai. When they have already penetrated so deep in the interior, naturally they do not want to go further with the possibility of getting bogged and of meeting annihilation. At the same time the Chinese have withdrawn to a safe distance. I have explained this situation clearly and fully in my book *The Secret of China's Resistance*.¹ Therein I had shown that this withdrawal and this fabian policy of "wait and see" was adopted on the planned basis according to the advice of the outstanding German Military Advisers, led by the veteran of World War I, General Von Faulkenhausen, who were in China till 1938.

The Stalemate

Thus, on the one hand, the Japanese are not willing to penetrate further deep in China, while the Chinese have entrenched themselves at a safe distance from them. Stalemate has thus occurred. Since then all fighting has

¹ Published by the Educational Publishing Company, Karachi.

been spasmodic. Stress was laid by the Chinese on guerilla warfare against the Japanese which has been going on since. And sometimes regular fighting takes place, only when the Japanese find a concentration of Chinese troops and supplies in any place. The Japanese move from their base nearest to such place, try to destroy such concentration and return to their base. Recent destruction of the Chinese air bases in Hunan and Kwangsi is an instance in point. Occupation of larger territory in the interior is also not intended by the Japanese. They rest satisfied with the occupation of key positions in the interior or on the coast. Larger territory means more troops which they can ill afford to spare. Before 1941, they wanted to keep all troops in readiness for any onslaught against Britain, America and Russia. At present, they actually want them for the purpose of war with the first two and for an eventuality of war with Russia. Therefore, after October, 1938, the Japanese have not resorted to any serious fighting with the Chinese.

The Chinese on the other hand do not want to risk a fight with Japan until they are fully prepared and troops are equipped with all modern means of war. Their experience in the past is bitter. Although they have won glorious victories in some places, they have been defeated in many places when they pitted their ill-equipped, bare-footed and half-starved soldiers against the Japanese. China is not an industrial country. So, mechanisation of the army had not even begun on any appreciable scale when the Sino-Japanese War started in 1931 and not even when the war was resumed in 1937. And without industries China could not produce the necessary war equipment. War is a mechanized industry and China had not developed

that industry. Rightly, Nathaniel Peffer, in his remarkable book *Japan and the Pacific* says "Were it (China) as martial as Sparta and twice as numerous in population as it is, it would be powerless against an enemy, any enemy, that can dispose of tanks, aeroplanes, motorised artillery and all other implements of modern warfare. Military prowess today is not a matter merely of martial spirit, courage or the will to war. It is the product of technological capacity and industrial organisation; of the means of communications, mass production, possession or command of raw materials. A highly evolved industrial system is an indispensable condition. And this is what China is lacking". This analysis of China's condition by the greatest American authority on the Far Eastern Affairs that Mr. Peffer is, is entirely true. China had only begun the process of industrialisation about 1937 when the war was resumed. She had no time to make any progress therein. And therefore, she has now to depend upon outside assistance for equipment and material. She could not also start new factories in these war-times as other countries in Europe and America have been busy with their own requirements for war and they cannot supply the material for factories in China. The Chinese therefore cannot produce the soldiers' equipment and munitions of war. For want of such equipment for the Chinese soldiers, the Japanese count twenty Chinese soldiers as equivalent to one Japanese soldier who is fully equipped and high in morale. The Chinese therefore do not want this human sacrifice of their unequipped soldiers to be repeated time and again, to allow themselves to be butchered by machines of Japan and at the same time be the laughing-stock of the world for their inglorious defeats,

sometimes even in small combats. Chiang is waiting for a proper opportunity and for a turn in the international situation favourable to China and prejudicial to Japan, and also for being fully equipped. It is only then that the Chinese can think of striking at Japan. No far-sighted general can risk a fight at an inopportune moment.

At the same time, the diplomatic offensive started by Japan ever since 1938 has been more active in recent times. In 1939 and 1940, there were some signs of peace. But the negotiations which were started in Hong Kong towards the end of 1939 were broken off mainly owing to the encouragement given to China by America and Britain and by Russia to some extent. The first two actually granted big loans to China that time. Promises of supplies were made by America and Britain and thus the negotiations between China and Japan failed. But when the tempo of the war in Europe began to grow fiercer and supplies were wanted to check Hitler, Chiang was forgotten and the Pacific was made the secondary stage. Both Churchill and Colonel Knox said so. China did not receive the arms and ammunition that she had expected. With the meagre supplies received, she could not fight Japan more actively and more openly. Only guerilla warfare was carried on. China had therefore to remain on the defensive, and thereafter the fighting in Hunan, Kwangsi, Fukien and Honan was only positional and temporary, to gain some local advantage.

Thus when China was in this position Japan, despite the failure of negotiations referred to above, again started her diplomatic offensive with greater vigour, and tried for a settlement with China. She therefore ceased bombing Chungking and avoided any bitter fighting with China

even when she could do otherwise. Wang's regime also acted as a brake on Japan's untrammelled advance in China. And thus, the Japanese for tactical, strategic and diplomatic reasons, practically stopped fighting in China after 1938. And if any fighting took place occasionally, it was merely for a local advantage and on a very small scale.

The result was the stalemate that has followed.

And it is this stalemate that has been responsible for bringing up again to the fore, the old-time rancours between the Nationalists and the Communists. The warlords also may have begun to show a flare for independence. When there is an active programme before a country, especially in foreign affairs, internal differences are made up and sectional feuds are forgotten to meet a common danger. This sentiment is often deliberately created and employed by statesmen for the purposes of the State. A foreign war or some foreign entanglement is best suited for the purpose of diverting attention from internal issues to foreign complications. The leaders can then ask for an united front against a common enemy. The most notable example of this subterfuge is the case of Russia in 1904. At that time Russia was on the brink of a revolution. But Russia's entanglement with Japan saved the internal situation and diverted the attention from revolution to war with Japan. This war with Japan was to a certain extent the result of the stiff attitude of the Russian diplomats and statesmen. And although it cannot be said definitely to what extent this adamantine attitude was due to the desire of the Russian statesmen to divert attention from the internal situation to foreign embroilment, the fact remains that the Russo-Japanese war

quietened the serious situation at home for the time being at least and postponed it till 1917. In this year, though Russia was at war with Germany, the revolution broke out because of the continued Russian reverses and the old trouble again took shape.

Thus, it is the time-honoured tradition that when foreign danger is present, there is a premium on internal unity. As soon as that is removed, slump in such unity, especially when such unity has not been completely accomplished, begins to manifest itself. This is what has happened in China.

Therefore unity in China, which had not been completely achieved when the Sino-Japanese war was renewed in July 1937, again received a set-back by this stalemate. The process was well on the way during the active period of the war in 1937 and 1938, but Chiang had not succeeded in completing it. If the war had continued on the same scale as before, the process would have been completed. During the course of the active period of the war the enthusiasm of all sections of the Chinese people was unquestioned and even in their withdrawals the Chinese people had covered themselves with glory.

Han Fu-Chu Incident

But the moment active fighting ceased and both parties (China and Japan) remained on the defensive, the *raison d'être* for the unity partly disappeared and signs of the renewal of the old rancours between various parties in China began to appear. Whispers of dissatisfaction of the Communists with the Kuomintang were often heard. But

we had not heard of any provincial warlords seriously showing any signs of defiance to or disregard of the Central Government. The incident of Han Fu-chu, the provincial warlord of Shantung, who had disobeyed Central Government orders, has been there before all of them. Han was arrested, court-martialled and shot in 1938 for refusing to obey the Central Government orders to stop Japan at any cost in October and November 1937 when Japan pressed southward from Peiping. Instead, he withdrew southwestward to save his army from annihilation if he were to fight the Japanese. He was shot for his dereliction of duty. This example served as a deterrent and a threat to any recalcitrant warlord, who might harbour similar intentions. And I do not know of any serious breach of discipline on the part of any other provincial satrap. Of course the food situation which the Central Government has not been able to ameliorate to any great extent might have alienated the sympathies of the people in the provinces, and therewith it might have affected to some extent the morale of the provincial rulers *vis-a-vis* the Central Government. But the bogey of the provincial warlords having seriously flouted the authority of the Central Government cannot be sustained. At least not to the extent of stating that the Central Government has ceased to exercise authority over the provinces. Let *Pravda* point out instances. Perhaps, the provincial warlords referred to may be those of Shensi, Kansu and Hsingkiang, that is, the Communist rulers of Shensi and Kansu and the pro-Russian governor, Sheng Shih-tsai of Hsingkiang. Owing to Russian encouragement, they may have flouted the authority of the Central Government. And we know that

they are not obeying the authority of the Central Government. We have no other instances of governors of any of the provinces of Nationalist China flouting the authority of the Central Government. And if any has occurred, it must be due to the fact that a foreigner is made practically the Chief-of-Staff of at least a part of the Chinese Army. This clearly gives the impression that the G'ssimo is not trusted or that he is not a capable leader, or that no Chinese is fit for the job. This impression might serve to lower the prestige of the Central Government headed by Chiang.

The Chinese Communists

The case with the Communists however is different. Their only common ground with the Nationalist China was the fight with Japan. When this fighting on large scale practically ceased, excepting for a few spells here and there, the Communists no doubt got restless and were apparently dissatisfied with the policy of inaction and waiting followed by the Central Government for reasons explained above. They might have shown signs of independent action against Japan, or even of severing connections with the Central Government. Their leader, President Miao Tse-tung is one of the shrewdest politicians going. So is Chou En-lai, the secretary of their party. Their Commander-in-Chief General Chu Teh is a man of action. They would not tolerate a policy of inaction against Japan. They would want Chiang to continue the fight with Japan. They had exacted the promise on behalf of him. It should be noted in this connection that the promise was not given by Chiang himself as he did not

want a conditional release. The promise was actually given by Madame Chiang, Mr. W. H. Donald and Dr. H. H. Kung, who conducted the negotiations for the release of G'ssimo at Sian when his capture was manœuvred by the Communists there in December 1936. It was on that understanding that he was released from captivity at Sian, and he fulfilled the promise when the time came for action against the Japanese. But Chiang's apparent inaction in subsequent years, that is, after 1938, could not be tolerated by the Communists. Chiang had his own reasons for this silence as we have seen above. But that silence led to straining of mutual relations between the Nationalists and the Communists. And these strained relations brought them nearer to fighting, and actual fighting took place in the summer of 1940.

At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the Communists have been encouraged in their separatist attitude by some countries, specially Russia. Most of the supplies which Russia sent to China have actually gone to the Communists. These supplies came over the only free route to China from Russia—the route through Lanchow and Sian, the latter being the capital of the Communist province of Shensi and the former that of Kansu. Sian and Lanchow formed the termini of the route at the Chinese end. And Sian is the headquarters of the Communists. The supplies which Russia is said to have sent to China therefore stopped mainly at Sian and only filtered through to Chungking. Even the supplies against the Tea loan which Chiang had contracted with Russia in 1938 were sent by Russia to the Communists in Sian. Since the Communists were incorporated into the National Army soon after July 1937, as the Eighth Route Army and later another Fourth Route

Army, Chiang apparently could take no exception to this procedure of supplies being sent to that army (8th Route Army). But this never failed to give him an impression that these so-called foreign friends did not trust him when he was sincere towards them and wholeheartedly fighting against Japan. It also exposes the real aim of Stalin viz., to help the Chinese Communists alone.

Similarly, the leader of our own Medical Mission—the Indian Medical Mission to China—Dr. Atal, preferred to work with the Communist Army in Sian and Yenan in Shensi instead of at Ichang or Kwangsi where the Nationalists were fighting the Japanese. The Mission was sent to Nationalist China—obviously to China led by Chiang Kai-shek who has been the supreme leader of China for years—and the Indian National Congress had no doubts about the same. But the Mission actually worked with the Communists, when its leader showed a definite preference to work with them (the Eighth Route Army operating in the North in Shensi and Shansi). The Chinese Medical and Red Cross authorities agreed to allow them to do so. But Chiang did not fail to notice the discrimination. In fact Dr. Atal further showed a sort of disrespect to Chiang by refusing to attend the latter's tea when Dr. Atal was sounded as to whether the members of the Mission would agree to attend the tea if invited officially. The result was that only Madame Chiang Kai-shek once invited them unofficially for tea at Chungking when G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek was not present. Those of the members who returned to India were also not interviewed by Chiang on their way back, after a year or two of their service to China, not even Dr. Atal because no such interview was sought. Of course, G'ssimo does not

interview all foreigners working for China, and this omission may be considered as an unessential formality. But Chiang usually grants interviews to important foreigners, and the Mission was so much talked of and so highly praised that the members had assumed that importance and G'ssimo would have received them in the normal course. As a matter of fact he did actually signify a desire to see them. But Dr. Atal did not see his way to meet him. And the only messages that they brought home from China to the Indian National Congress were from Miao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders.

This kind of side-tracking of the Nationalist China and Chiang could not certainly be relished by the Chinese leader. And those who now blame Chiang for disunity in China—specially in the case of the Communists—are themselves to be blamed to some extent for encouraging the separatist attitude of the Communists. This distrust, mainly on the part of Soviet Russia, of the Nationalist Government in China, is at the root of the present trouble between the two sections, and the definite encouragement to the Communists has added fuel to the fire. It does not therefore lie with those very people like, for instance, the Russians and their *Pravda*, to talk about disunity in China and friction between the Nationalists and the Communists, when they themselves have nursed such differences. And the first to raise this bogey against Chiang were the Soviet Russian *Pravda* and the Soviet leader, Stalin, who was responsible for moving the Chinese Communists to Shensi and sending supplies to them instead of despatching the same properly to the Central Government at Chungking.

This attitude is nothing new either to old Tsarist Russia or to Soviet Russia. Both of them have pursued an exactly identical and imperialistic policy towards China as may be seen from the following historical sketch.

Stalin's Imperialistic Background

Since Russians have looked east they have never looked back. They have been looking further east, both the Tsarist Russians as well as the Soviet Russians.

The Russians started their eastward trek in 1580 when Yermak, an outlaw, led the way. Since then, their speed has been surprising, almost phenomenal; for, in just about a century, they travelled and conquered 6,000 miles long territory and reached the sea in the east, the Pacific board. The rapidity of their advance was remarkable. In 1587 they reached Tobolsk; in 1604, they reached Tomsk; in 1619, Yeniseisk; in 1632, Yakertsk; in 1638, Okhotsk. Up to this time, they met no opposition. But after Okhotsk they came in conflict with the Chinese. However, sometimes by ambushes and small clashes, and sometimes by negotiations, they reached the Amur, the Shilka and the Dseya rivers in about 1646. They reached Irkutsk in about 1650 and Albazin in about 1653. Thereafter, conflict between China and Russia began to grow in proportion; and it was because of the strong personality of that remarkably powerful Manchu Emperor of China, Kang Hsi, that the Russians were humbled and sought permanent peace. This Treaty was concluded in 1689, and it is the first treaty made by China with an European power.

This treaty demarcated the river Kerbechi and the long chain of mountains below the source of that river and extending up to the Eastern Seas, as the boundary between China and Russia. All territories north of that boundary were Russian and those to the south were Chinese.

By this treaty Russia cleverly legalized the loot of the Siberian territories and got recognition of the same by the greatest power of the East that China then was.

Russia utilized the opportunity and respite for stabilising her gains. But having accomplished it, further expansion was not away from the thought of the Russians. One commitment leads to another and the propinquity of territories often leads to friction. Having obtained some territory, desire for more is ever present, and neighbourliness usually creates questions of border defence and of undemarcated boundaries. Gran Chaco War is a bloody example. So it was with Russia. Acquisition of large territories naturally raised border questions and several others. An "ice-free" port was wanted as an outlet for Russia. So came in the 19th century the interference in Korea which had been under Chinese suzerainty since the 7th century. Chemulpo (Fusan) was the port in view. Then Manchuria is a Golden Land and an ice-free port there would better serve the end. So again, China was to be the victim and the lease of Ports Arthur and Dalny (Dairen) and of the entire Liaoning Peninsula was obtained by Russia after pressing China hard for the bargain (1898). And it was only Japan that thwarted these ambitions, first by eliminating Russia from Korea as a result of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and planting herself there which stopped Russian machina-

tions there, and later in 1904-5 by eliminating Russia from Manchuria by defeating Russia.

Thus, ever since Russia stabilised her position in Asia by her treaty with China in 1689, Russia has been meddling in Chinese affairs and all along waiting like a vulture ready to pounce upon any suitable spot by seizing a suitable opportunity like an internal trouble and confusion in China. In the 19th century when China was harassed by the European adventurers on all sides and weakened in all ways, Russia did not rest quiet and did not help China to mitigate her woes. On the contrary, sometimes very subtly and often surreptitiously, sometimes by sweet words and sometimes by threats, Russia wormed herself up into the sinews of the Chinese Empire. In 1901 Russia went to the extent of forcibly occupying Manchuria, ostensibly as a reward for not attacking China during the Boxer Movement. China was unable to dislodge her from that position. This occupation led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

This policy has been consistently followed by Russia all along, Tsar or no Tsar, Tsarists or Reds. Whether Tsarists or White or Red Russians, the colour of their spectacles has always been the same. It has been the same dark, dusky, ravenous colour to look at China—always a prey for Russian enterprise and adventure. The Reds fully following in the path of the imperialist countries added the sauce of an ideology which the harassed and oppressed Chinese people thought was a charm. But underneath and behind this sinister approach there has been no other motive but the mortgage or appropriation of China's sinews.

Enter Reds

The Reds (Soviets) began their contacts with China with bombastic phrases of noblest sentiments (1919).

Having met stiff opposition from the imperialist and capitalist countries in Europe in the propagation of their new creed, the Soviets turned their attention to the East, where the depredations of the Western Powers had reduced the people to a state of slavery, despondency and agonising mental condition. The latter had no early hope of regaining their independence. Here was therefore a fine raw material to be used for the new Soviet ideology of the *raj* of the proletariat. To such people the Soviet catch phrases like "the rule of the workers and the peasants", "freedom from exploitation for the toilers of the world", "destruction of capitalism and substitution of labour therefor", "destruction of imperialism and establishment of peoples' rule" came as a charm. Soviet Russia itself came as a saviour. China was the nearest eastern country for experiments. That country was then in the midst of large-scale student movements against the bad treatment of China by the imperialist powers in the Versailles Treaty, whereby Kiachow was intended to be conceded to Japan. China had besides several other grievances against the imperialistic countries of the West whose ally she had become during World War 1. But her participation in the war against Germany on the side of the Allies was, as if, rewarded by depriving her of the Kiachow peninsula in Shantung province, held formerly by Germany as a concession, and giving the same to Japan! This additional grouse against the Western countries shattered all China's

faith in the declarations and protestations of the imperialistic countries of the West, and China became an easy convert to the spacious ideology of the Soviet Reds. The internal situation in China itself with corrupt officialdom and predatory warlords helped the process. The Revolution had not yet been completed in China. The Northern warlords steeped in the traditions of the feudalistic days had not yet reconciled themselves to the principles of democracy so vigorously expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and interneccine warfare was still going on.

In the midst of such disquieting conditions in China, the new ideology of the Reds was acclaimed and hailed by the intellectuals and common people of China. Everybody looked to Soviet Russia for emancipation of the oppressed and the harassed. And the bombastic declarations of the leaders of the new creed in Russia fired the imagination of the people of China as everywhere else. Many of these declarations were specially meant to catch the ears of the Chinese people. The one of December 1919 will bear quotation:

“ All people, whether they are great or small, whether they have lived until now a free life, or whether they form against their own will a part of another country, shall be free in their inner life and no power interfere with them within this limit. The Government of workers and peasants has declared null and void, all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China and the ex-allies, the treaties which were to enable the Russian Government of the Tsar and his allies to enslave the people of the East and principally the people of China by intimidating or buying them for the sole interests of the capitalists, financiers, and the

Russian generals. The Soviet Government invites henceforth, the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations with the object of cancelling the treaty of 1896, the protocol of Peking of 1901 and all the agreements concluded with Japan from 1907 to 1916. That is to say, to give back to the Chinese people all the power and authority which were obtained by the Government of the Tsar by tricks or by entering into understanding with Japan and the allies....

“We herewith address the Chinese people with the object of making them thoroughly understand that the Soviet Government has given up all the conquests made by the Government of the Tsar which took away from China Manchuria and territories.

“The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people *without demanding any kind of compensation*, the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines, and all the things which were seized from them by Government of the Tsar, that of Kerensky, and brigands, Horvath, Semenov, Koltchak, the Russian Ex-generals, merchants and capitalists.

“The Soviet Government gives up the indemnities payable by China for the Boxers in 1900.

“The Soviet Government has abolished all the special privileges and factories owned by the Russian merchants in the Chinese territory; no Russian official, priest, or missionary should be allowed to interfere with the Chinese affairs and if they should commit any crime, they must be judged according to the local laws in local courts. No authority or law court should

be allowed to exist in China except the authority of the Chinese people.

“Besides these principal points, the Soviet Government represented by its plenipotentiaries, is ready to negotiate with the Chinese people all other questions and to settle once for all, all the cases of acts of violence and injustice which were committed towards China by the former Government of Russia, acting together with Japan and the Allies.”

This declaration of 1919 was later (in 1920) made more specific and reaffirmed by the Soviets in the form of a draft for a treaty with seven Articles on which to base the rehabilitation and settlement of the Sino-Russian relations in future. The text is as follows:—

“Article (1) The Government of the Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by former Government of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and restores to China without any compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Czar’s Government and the Russian bourgeoisie.

“Article (2) The Government of both the republics shall take necessary measures for immediately establishing regular trade and economic relations. A special treaty to this effect shall be subsequently concluded on the principle of the clause of the most-favoured nation, applying to both contracting parties.

“Article (3) The Chinese Government pledges itself (1) Not to proffer any aid to Russian counter-revolutionary individuals, groups, or organisations, not to

allow their activities in Chinese territory (2) to disarm, intern and hand over to the Government of Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics all the detachments and organisations to be found in Chinese territory at the time of the signing of the treaty which are fighting against the R.S.F.S.R. or States allied with her, and to give over to the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. all their arms, munitions and property.

“ Article (4) All the Russian citizens residing in China shall be subject to the laws and regulations acting in the territory of the Chinese Republic, and shall not enjoy any rights of extra-territoriality. The Chinese citizens residing in Russia shall be subject to all the laws and regulations acting in the territory of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics.

“ Article (5) The Government of the Chinese Republic pledges itself: (1) immediately upon the signing of the present treaty to sever connections with persons styling themselves as diplomatic and consular representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. and to deport such persons from China, (2) to hand over to the Russian State in the person of the R.S.F.S.R. the buildings of the Embassy and Consulates and the property and archives of the same situated in Chinese territory and belonging to Russia.

“ Article (6) The Government of R.S.F.S.R. renounces any compensation paid out by China as indemnity for the Boxer rising provided that under no circumstances shall the Government of the Chinese Republic pay any money to the former Russian consular or to any

pointed out that the first declaration (of 1919) was published by the official representatives of the Soviet Russia in the Far East, and a copy of the second declaration (of September 27, 1920) was actually handed over by the Kremlin to the Chinese representative in Moscow, Major-General Chang Shih-lin, and brought back by him to Peking. Both these declarations were identical with those published above. And yet Karakhan had the barefacedness, as we shall see later, to produce from his Red Government a so-called "official" document in which reference to giving up compensation for the railway was dropped! Ultimately when on May 31, 1924, the Agreement was actually drawn, the Soviet Reds succeeded in exacting a clause concerning Chinese Eastern Railway that the Railway will be returned to China—after 60 years!! The management in the meantime was to remain in the hands of the Soviet officials!!!

Outer Mongolia and Manchuria

Similar tactics were adopted in Mongolia and Manchuria in purely Tsarist fashion in the post-Tsarist period.

The Tsar, by a series of subterfuges had succeeded in 1912 in separating Outer Mongolia from China and creating out of it a separate autonomous State, acknowledging only nominal sovereignty of China. But the entire internal administration of Mongolia, its commerce and industry, its exports and imports, and almost every activity was controlled and managed by Russians under the guise of guiding the autonomous State through Russian advisers. This was continued throughout World War I.

But when the Reds came in power in Russia and settled down to business, did the conditions change? NO. Their hunger was whetted by the additional stimulus of ideology which they threw in the face of the Mongolians. And whereas the Tsar had only got Outer Mongolia separated from China, the Reds tried to bring the whole of Mongolia within the orbit of their influence by a series of reprehensible steps. A move was afoot in 1919 by Mongolians for a Pan-Mongolian state under the leadership of Semenov, a Russo-Mongolian, and the Soviets found a good opportunity for interference.

But China had in the meantime, succeeded by diplomatic manœuvring, by coaxing and also by a little show of threat, to induce the Mongolians to cancel the autonomy of Outer Mongolia,—by an Agreement of April-May, 1919. Thereby the independence movement was also squashed. This was not to the taste of the Soviets. So efforts were made to make Mongolia independent, and in 1920 when internal dissensions in China were at a premium, the Reds engineered an independence movement in Mongolia. When the movement gained some ground, the Soviets offered assistance to China to crush the White troops in Mongolia. The Chinese Government, though rather weak at the time, declined the offer, knowing as it did what was at the back of the Soviet mind. But the Reds were not to be daunted. They decided to march troops into Urga (1920), the capital of Outer Mongolia, on the plea that the Chinese in Urga had requested the Reds to help them against the White Russians. In order to withstand the efforts of the Red troops to enter Mongolia by any means possible, Baron Ungern the Deputy of Semenov, marched up to the borders of Russian territory, but was defeated

and later executed by the Reds, just because he was patriotic and wanted to save Mongolia from the Red interference! The Red troops did not enter Urga that time.

But the Reds did not allow the grass to grow under their feet. The defeat of Ungern gave them the golden opportunity for interference.

Here, they employed their new ideology and high-sounding phrases of the salvation of the oppressed humanity. And thus their technique of achieving that salvation for the people of other's territories was first tested in Mongolia, the next door neighbour of Russia. A "People's Revolutionary Party" was brought into existence (1920). The Party reformed itself into People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia and appealed to the Soviet for assistance against Ungern's troops composed of White Russians and Mongolians and Ungern's troops were eliminated as we have seen above. Some time after, however, Red troops actually entered Urga and annihilated the White Russians as well as the entire opposition that was left there after Ungern. Thereafter a purely Puppet Government was established in Mongolia with Soviet spoon-feeding, and Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia was established in the place of the previous one. On September 1, 1920, its first declaration began with:

"In the third year, we Mongolians, under the pressure of the circumstances of the times, have lost our autonomous government to the benefit of the Chinese, the autocratic reactionaries" etc., etc.

This will show the purely anti-Chinese attitude prompted by the Reds.

Further an appeal was obtained from this Puppet regime that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from Mongolia! And so the Soviet troops continued to remain there by circumventing the Chinese protests. Subsequently concerted efforts were made, and the mutual recognition of Soviet Russia and the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia was stage-managed by a secret Agreement containing nine clauses with this Puppet Government. By this Agreement, the Soviets got everything they wanted in Mongolia. And thus the control of the army, commerce and industry, exports and imports besides all the political power in Mongolia especially, passed on to Soviet Russia. Money could be remitted only to Russia and to no other country. All the opponents of the Soviet regime were "liquidated" one after another, including the Living Buddha.

The Chinese suspected of this secret Red Agreement with Mongolia, and when they first inquired of the Russian envoy M. Paikes about it, he replied that no such Agreement existed. But later, in a conversation with the Chinese Foreign Minister the same envoy, M. Paikes admitted its existence! A case of white (or Red) lie !!

At a later stage the Mongolians, and even the Puppet Ministers soon became tired of the Red intrigues and pressure, and signified their desire to rejoin the Chinese Republic. At this time, by a stroke of brilliant and motiveful diplomacy, the Soviets offered their good offices for the purpose, because, they saw thereby chances of getting concessions both from Mongolia and from China. The offer was a double-barrelled gun which could hit both. But the Chinese were too shrewd for the Soviets and refused to deal with the question of Mongolia alone and

placed it on the agenda for the general settlement of the Sino-Russian Question which arose later. But after all these manœuvres, the Soviets succeeded in extorting Outer Mongolia from the Chinese and making it an Autonomous State, under the name of "Soviet Republic of Outer Mongolia". And it was not till 1935 when Russia had need of China in their common desire to stop Japanese aggression in China that Soviet Russia agreed to acknowledge the nominal sovereignty of China over Outer Mongolia where once a year the Chinese flag is hoisted and saluted since then.

Similar efforts were made in Manchuria through Chang Tso-lin, the warlord of Manchuria. Secret agreements were reported to have been made with him and other local authorities, and Soviet envoys were active. Chang Tso-lin was keen on restoring the Manchu Dynasty in China and hoped to secure Soviet aid to that end. So, the Soviet representatives in the vicinity of the Chinese Eastern Railway were in close touch with Chang and his subordinates, and the Reds had not the least scruples of allying themselves with Chang whose intentions of restoring monarchy in China were then quite well-known.

China Proper

Having begun their intrigues in territories surrounding China proper over which China claimed sovereignty, the Soviets did not fail to focus their main attention on China itself. While they were staging in Mongolia and Manchuria dramas of force, of lying, of diplomacy and ideological approach, the Soviet leaders approached China

by a different method. This also was begun with the same bombastic bluster of salvation of the oppressed people through Red assistance. The two declarations of 1919 and 1920 referred to above were directed towards China to allure the people of China as preliminary to obtaining China's recognition of the Soviet Regime in Russia. Soon after, M. Joffe, as we have mentioned before, was sent to China as the head of a Trade Mission to Peking (August, 1922). He submitted a Memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Office on September 2, 1922, asking for commencement of negotiations on the basis of 1919 and 1920 declarations for trade and other general settlement between Russia and China. The Chinese Government naturally raised the question of the Soviet troops in Mongolia; but Joffe sidetracked the item by now insisting on general settlement without isolating any particular item. Another question was that of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese had clearly read the words in the Declarations of the Soviet Leader, M. Karakhan, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that the Railway was to be returned to China "without demanding any kind of compensation". But Joffe informed the Chinese Government, as we have seen before, that only those concessions that were obtained by the former Russian Government by predatory and violent policy alone were denounced by the Soviet Government and not others. The Chinese stood aghast at this new interpretation of the above two Declarations of Karakhan, and began a cautious approach to Joffe's negotiations. Several other factors prevented a consummation of the Sino-Soviet Agreement and Joffe had to be replaced by M. Karakhan himself to resume the negotiations in China. Before leaving China however,

Joffe had succeeded in arriving at a workable basis of agreement with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai, which later paved the way for the Agreement on May 31, 1924.

Karakhan arrived in Peking in August, 1923. But before he arrived there, he intended to come to a secret understanding or agreement with Chang Tso-lin over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and then face the Chinese Government with a *fait accompli*. Fortunately, Chang did not fall that time in the trap, and Karakhan came to Peking without reaching any agreement with Chang. However, a secret agreement was later entered into on September 20, 1924, between Soviet Russia and Chang Tso-lin, in which Manchuria was referred to as "Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China". The implication of this was the recognition of Chang as the ruler of Manchuria when he was in revolt against the Central Government of China. And Manchuria itself was recognized as an "Autonomous" State which could later be converted into a Soviet State as in Mongolia. Recognition of "Autonomous State" was the first step. Apparently the Soviet intentions here were the same as in Mongolia. And again, China was the party to be hit.

When Karakhan arrived in Peking, and began his negotiations with the Chinese Government, he adopted an imperious and deceitful attitude even far surpassing that of the representatives of the imperialistic and capitalistic powers whom the Soviets condemned. He asked for recognition of the Soviet regime in Russia first so that thereafter the negotiations could be conducted. This was a bombshell on the negotiations, because the implication of

China's outright recognition of the Soviet regime would have been to make that regime legal heir of the Tsarist regime in Russia. Once this fact was established, then the Soviet envoy could twist the situation as it suited him. Questions like that of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Soviet troops in Mongolia could be settled then as he would want them to be settled. But the Chinese diplomacy was equal to the occasion and the Chinese Government insisted on the settlement of all the questions before recognition was given to the Soviet regime. Karakhan also produced, as stated before, the so-called official or authoritative versions of the 1919 and 1920 Declarations which were disputed by the Chinese and not accepted by them. Dr. C. T. Wang was then deputed to negotiate with Karakhan. They arrived at a formal draft of the agreement. But the Chinese Cabinet refused to endorse the agreement in toto and made certain changes which they were no doubt entitled to. However, this infuriated Karakhan and he gave a 72 hours ultimatum to the Chinese Government to accept or to reject the draft. (Does this not remind one of Cripp's offer of 48 hours duration to the Indians in April, 1942?). However, the Chinese Government adopted a calmer attitude after the time limit had expired, and an agreement was reached and signed on May 31, 1924. China, which was expecting the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway forthwith without compensation, had nevertheless to agree to receive the Railway back after 60 years. This was because Chiang Tso-lin was later inclined towards a settlement with the Soviets although he did not entertain the proposal in the beginning.

Defence of Imperial Gains

With reference to the later incident when the Chinese tried to take over the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Nathaniel Peffer, the greatest American authority on the Pacific and Far Eastern problems and perhaps second only to W. G. Woodhead, the British expert on those problems, has a very pungent criticism to offer about the Soviet regime and Soviet methods. The Chinese attempt was met by Soviet Russia by an armed opposition. Peffer puts it very graphically in his book *Japan and the Pacific*¹:—

“ It (Russia) retaliated swiftly and orthodoxy. It sent a military force, gave the Chinese a sound thrashing, drove them out and took back the railway.”

Peffer then goes on to comment, half humorously and half sarcastically in the following significant words:—

“ Incongruously the first serious defence of imperialistic gains in China was made, not by one of the imperialist countries, but by a Communist country, and, moreover, by the one which had taught the Chinese how to indoctrinate and organise the people for resistance against imperialism. Soviet Russia, headquarters of the Communist International, had acted in the best nineteenth century British Tory manner”.

Peffer further adds “ by that episode, also an example was set for Japan ”.

Thus it is Soviet Russia that made a pattern for imperialistic Japan in modern times.

¹ Published in 1935.

The above instances, purely imperialistic in their conception and execution, including duplicity and threat, clearly indicate that there is no difference whatsoever between the Tsarist Regime and the Soviet Regime in their outlook towards China. The examples are not different from any known imperialistic methods condemned by the Soviets. In fact Dr. Ken Shen Weigh, Ph.D., a renowned Chinese scholar and politician in his *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy* (published in 1928) clinches the argument to the counter in the following significant words:—

“ From the foregoing notes and utterances, we see that there is really little difference between the role played by Czarist Russia in engineering the Mongolian independence in 1912 and the role played by Soviet Russia in bringing about the independence of Mongolia for the second time in 1920. Both lent their military assistance to the Mongolians liberally. But in tactics, Soviet Russia had gone one better on the Czarist Russia in the creation of a Provisional People's Revolutionary party in Mongolia which was to appeal to Moscow for armed assistance”.

Thus, the stirring up of revolutionary tactics in Mongolia, separation of Mongolia from China by methods which are certainly not creditable, a Secret Agreement with Puppet Mongolia against China, the control of the army and of all economic resources of Mongolia and eventual establishment of a Soviet Republic in Outer Mongolia under the aegis of Soviet Russia, a secret treaty with the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, over the Chinese Eastern Railway to coerce China into acquiescing to Soviet stand, the practical recognition of Manchuria as an auto-

nomous state by that secret agreement, thereby secretly plotting to violate China's sovereignty, mischievous and selfish interpretation of one's own declarations, substitution of one "paper" for another so-called "authoritative" to suit one's own ends, marching of troops into China's territories and keeping them there despite China's protests, holding out threats to China by stationing troops near the Chinese Eastern Railway to force the hands of the Chinese Government for a favourable agreement with the Soviet—if these and several other similar steps and methods, with which Soviet Russians began their contact with China since 1919 after their filibuster about salvation of the oppressed people, are not to be considered as 100 per cent. "imperialistic" and "capitalistic", then the two terms would lose all their meaning and implications. The guns were there, the dollar was there, and the diplomacy was there. These are the pet weapons of imperialism to force itself on unwilling people. The Soviets, however, improved upon them and added the ideology of Communism—"the raj of the common people, by the common people, and for the common people". And this last one disarmed all suspicion about the hypocrisy of Soviet diplomacy towards China.

Thus, even when the enthusiasm for the new creed was at its highest, even when the Soviets wanted adherents, and even when they wanted recognition of their regime in Russia, the Soviet leaders and their representatives in the Far East had no scruples to resort to all the crooked methods of imperialism towards China, what can one expect from Soviet Russia in later years when it had gathered strength, when it had obtained recognition from leading powers, and had established its new creed firmly

within its own borders and had secured some adherents elsewhere? Subsequent history is the revised and enlarged edition of similar misdeeds, deceits and selfishness in their dealings with China. And if any people still believe that the Soviets have been doing all this philanthropically and for the cultural improvement of the world, one can only pity them for their poor intelligence. The entire policy of the Soviets is to make others subserve the interests of Russia and of no others.

Nationalists and Reds

Subsequent history of Soviet Russia's diplomacy with China has been one of purely selfish designs on the latter.

When the negotiations with the Chinese Government were going on and when Joffe was discussing with Dr. Sun Yat-sen for an agreed formula on Sino-Russian relations, the latter deputed Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow in 1923 to study the military and political organisation of the Soviet. Chiang returned to Canton after six months with Comrade Borodin and Marshal Vassili Blucher who had assumed the name of "Gallen". On his return to Canton, Chiang founded, in collaboration with Borodin and Blucher, the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton in 1924. Chiang, Borodin and Blucher planned the famous North China Expedition of August, 1926, after the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in March, 1925. This expedition was aimed at punishing the northern militarists, mainly the Anfu Clique led by General Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, and for bringing the northern territories under the National Government control. They carried everything be-

fore them, and in 1927, the Chinese Central Government was established at Nanking. In 1928, Chiang was elected President of the National Government. General Chiang Kai-shek, however, soon discovered that he was being used by his Communist advisers like Borodin and others as merely a tool or figure-head to further their own designs in China. Most of the Chinese leaders even of pro-Soviet tendencies agreed that China was not yet ripe for Bolshevism. They had to carry out the course of revolution as chalked out for them by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Republic in China. Dr. Sun had made it a condition in his agreement with Joffe that Communism was not to be propagated in China by the Soviet representatives. And the course as laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen for the achievement of the republican status by China was the best course to be followed. Though punctuated by gradual stages, it was the safest. But Soviet leaders went the other way; and ultimately, the dominance of the Chinese Government through the Soviet Advisers, the machinations of the Soviet leaders and representatives in China, the orgy of rebellions promoted by them everywhere in China which ultimately discredited China in the eyes of the world, and similar other factors made General Chiang Kai-shek reconsider his policy. And with the unanimous support of the enlightened and progressive Chinese leaders he decided to end the Soviet encroachments in China. If these advances of the Russian Reds in China were only for the interest of China, perhaps they would have been tolerated. But it was not so. Behind such advances there was the sinister diplomacy of the Third International for world domination. China was to be the Key, the corner-stone of the Communist world revolu-

tion. And this Third International was only another name for the Soviet Foreign Office.

Let us again quote Nathaniel Peffer, who is by no means unfriendly to Soviet Russia, from his brilliant book on the Far Eastern affairs, *Japan and the Pacific*. On page 80 thereof, he refers to the break of the Chinese Nationalists from their Soviet friends in 1928 in the following words:—

“That the Russians were rapidly acquiring the power of decision in the Nationalist Government in 1926 and 1927 through the Communist Party (of China) is beyond dispute. In the original agreement between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Joffe, the Russian representative, it was formally set down that Communism was not suited to China. Nevertheless every effort was made to organise Chinese Communists and to insert them into the Nationalist Party as a compact nucleus. The nucleus grew..... By the middle of 1927, it (the nucleus) was making an open bid for *exclusive* authority. It cannot be doubted that the affairs of China would have been determined in Moscow thereafter if the Chinese had not broken with the Russians. The Nationalist Revolution (in China in 1911) would then have had the result of substituting one alien master, though Communist, for many imperialist masters. China would still have remained independent in name only. And while there were numerous Chinese who sincerely believed in Communism and some who even understood its tenets, the overwhelming majority had responded only to the appeal of national independence”.

It is difficult to differ from such a high and impartial authority like Peffer on this subject writing seven years after the incident. The situation is so clearly stated by him. He leaves no room for doubt as to Soviet intentions. It is understood that even a price was put on Chiang's head.

Once, therefore, determined to put down the Red menace, Chiang wielded his sword with vigour and succeeded in dislodging the Communists from their stronghold in Kiangsi. The war lasted seven years from 1928 to 1935. During this period Stalin was practically quiet, as the Reds in China could not be kept supplied with arms and ammunition because of the long distance from Russia, to fight Nationalist China. But he tried other methods to wound China. In 1932 when Japan was fighting China, Stalin offered even a Non-Aggression Treaty to Japan which the latter then declined. Was this a friendly act towards China to propitiate the enemy of China? But in 1935, when Japan herself made the approach to Soviet Russia, the latter sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan! Both these acts were meant to give hints to Chiang.

And thus, Stalin was not to be outdone in China by Chiang's determination to exterminate the Reds from that country. But he went further. And now was staged one of the most spectacular dramas in China which has since changed the whole course of the Soviet diplomacy *vis-a-vis* China.

Reds Shift to Shensi

Many people think that the Reds were driven out of Kiangsi by General Chaing, and therefore, they went and settled in Shensi far away from the centre of the National-

ist Government of China. This does not seem quite convincing. I see clearly the hand of Stalin therein. Mark Gayn, an American correspondent in the Far East for a long time, in his informative book *The Fight for the Pacific*¹ puts the matter quite clearly in the following words:—

“Russia’s counter move (against Japan), apart from her military preparations in Siberia, was the shift of the Chinese Communist armies from Central to North China. Many observers believe that the Red migration was necessitated by General Chiang Kai-shek’s tightening stranglehold on the Communist territory in Kiangsi. I am not one of them. By withstanding five great offensives in isolated Kiangsi, the Communists had clearly shown their independence of the Soviet sources of supplies. Once out of General Chiang’s steel ring, they could easily have established a new base in the rich and discontented south-west (Kweichow and Yunan). What happened instead was this: The Chinese Communist armies drove south, defeating all opposition, and then in a manoeuvre as surprising as it was daring, veered northwards to the hungry, barren north-west. When they reached Shensi province the Reds, virtually junking their Communist program, called for a holy war on Japan”.

It was difficult for Stalin to make use of the Chinese Communists and to supply them arms and ammunition for that purpose from a distance with the ever-present danger of such arms being intercepted by the Nationalists in the intervening nationalist territories. If the Chinese

¹ Published in 1941.

Reds are in Shensi they would be only next door neighbours and every kind of support would be given to them. With Hsingkiang (Chinese Turkestan) under Soviet influence and Outer Mongolia practically a Soviet State, if the two intervening provinces of Shensi and Kansu are also brought under Soviet influence then Russia's long-cherished designs on China can be successfully executed. China can thus be brought under Soviet control. The Soviet expansion can then proceed from the west to the east in one continuous, contiguous and homogeneous rush, just as the Russian expansion itself had proceeded from the west to the east centuries back since 1580. Behind the Chinese Reds in Shensi, there would be the whole strength of Soviet Russia, and all communications would be easy. Stalin could also exploit the Chinese Reds to fight Japan or China as he liked and whenever it suited him. Therewith the process of further expansion could also be accelerated. Let us quote again Nathaniel Peffer from his remarkable book *Japan And The Pacific*.¹

"The consequences (of China going under Russian influence) are easy to imagine and hard to over-estimate. A Russianized China would make the larger part of Asia Communistic. Almost one-third of the human race would then be under the Red flag. The social revolution would be taken to the borders of India, down to French Indo-China and almost to the door of British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippine Islands, where already there is nationalistic unrest and a desire for independence from white nations. Most of all, it will raise the old Russian

¹ P. 158 of 1935 Edition.

bogey for the British. It would renew, with more reality than old, the Anglo-Russian rivalry for dominance in Asia as of 1890's. Now there would be this difference: that Kipling's 'Bear That Walks Like a Man' really would be at the Himalayas looking down on the plains of India".

And the effect of the Chinese Reds settling in Shensi was that within a few days of their arrival there, they began talking of a Holy War against Japan—a cry which was hardly heard so loudly since 1928 when Chiang began his expedition against them, or during the Sino-Japanese trouble since September 18, 1931. In fact, even during the worst years of Japanese aggression in 1932 and 1933, the Chinese Reds had kept General Chiang Kai-shek worried and they never offered their co-operation to General Chiang to fight Japan. Thereby they rather helped Japan instead of helping China to fight Japan.

But immediately they arrived in Shensi in 1935, a Holy War on Japan was declared. And Soviet Russia always considered Japan as its enemy.

However, it was not only Japan that was in view when Stalin perhaps managed to move the Chinese Reds from Kiangsi to Shensi. He could kill two birds with one stone. He could use them also against General Chiang Kai-shek whom he must have marked down as an enemy of Communism. Japan was the historical enemy of Russia's political and territorial expansion in the east; General Chiang Kai-shek had then become the enemy of Russia's Communism and World Revolution. Chiang would further prevent Russia's exploitation of China. Both Chiang and Japan, therefore, are to be eliminated, at least,

weakened by making them fight each other. And the Chinese Communists would serve as a convenient tool in the process and a first step in the execution of that policy. So, they must needs be near at hand.

Thus, the Chinese Communists came near at hand for Stalin. This was not therefore a fortuitous circumstance. To accomplish this, the Chinese Communists worked wonders and established glowing records. They faced and surmounted all the dangers of travel through eight provinces with Chiang's troops often surrounding and pursuing them; they stood the dangers of pestilence, extreme cold and snow; withstood disease and starvation facing them all the while in their 6000-miles trek from Kiangsi to Shensi; made little of the high mountains, deep rivers and thick jungles intervening, and fought against the wild animals and reptiles that were reducing their numbers on the way. They could have settled in the nearby rich Provinces like Szechuen, Kweichow and Yunnan which lay rather away from the reach of the Central Government. It was not absolutely essential for them to betake themselves to Shensi several thousands miles away at one stretch under such severely trying conditions. But they braved all the risks and dangers because they wanted to be in a territory contiguous to Communist Russia. This 'Westward Ho' cost them 50,000 men. They started from Kiangsi with 100,000 men, women and children. But only 50,000 reached Shensi.

Once the subtle strategy behind these moves is understood and accepted, then the whole panorama of the Soviet policy towards China thereafter unfolds itself in its true colour and vivid perspective. One can then read the meaning of successive events in the Sino-Russian diplo-

macy since 1935 quite clearly. What with the Sian Affair of December 12, 1936, when General Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped at the instance of the Chinese Reds aided by Chiang's own commander Marshal Chiang Hsenh-liang; what with Russia agreeing to accept China's nominal sovereignty over Outer Mongolia as a bait to China; what with the insistence of the Reds to fight the Japanese, and the subsequent *apparent* merging of the Chinese Communist army with the National Army of China; and what with their separate administration practically outside the power and scope of the Nationalist Government of China—the subtle Soviet diplomacy is clearly discernible in all these. At the time of Chiang's captivity, there is reason to believe that the wires between Si-an and Moscow were kept busy; and it used to be whispered that it was on Moscow's advice that Chiang was released after a promise to fight Japan was exacted from him. Killing Chiang would have brought both the Chinese Reds and Soviet Russia into universal odium. On the other hand, he could be exploited for better purpose by making him work as Stalin would desire.

The result was the rapprochement between the Reds and the Nationalists in China in February 1937, and the resumption of Sino-Japanese War in July following.

Why?

China and Japan Played

Japan was in the path of Russia's political and territorial expansion eastward in Asia, and Chiang of China was an obstacle to the ideological conquest of China. China would later incidentally serve also as a field for economic

exploitation by Russia and a market for the Russian products. The best way therefore was to encourage both simultaneously or alternately to fight each other, so that both should lose their strength in the fight. In the meantime, the Siberian Army would be strengthened, the Far Eastern Territories would be developed as hinterlands behind that Army, and thereby general position of Russia will be strengthened to deal a decisive blow at an opportune moment when both China and Japan would be weakened in fighting with each other. Russia will then be in a dictatorial position in the Eastern affairs, because if China is brought under Russian influence, even America and Britain can be eliminated from China.

So, often China was helped, and often a show of fight was staged against Japan to test the strength of Japan and also to test Russia's new weapons and aeroplanes. Both China and Japan were then kept guessing as to the real attitude of Stalin. Japan was anxious to avoid a clash with Russia. The former had an eye on the south and did not want to have any trouble in her rear. Consequently despite the crop of border clashes, no serious trouble arose between Russia and Japan. Both were anxious to avoid a direct war with each other. Russia did not want to be involved because, she had not completed her preparations for war on her two sides. Also the fear of war with Germany was there. For that reason Stalin renewed year after year the Fishery Agreement with Japan and also sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan when the latter was at war with China. This friendly gesture towards Japan along with several other similar acts at a time when China had reasons to believe that Russia was friendly with her, kept China guessing about Russia's intentions towards

China as it did also keep Japan guessing about the same. Both thought Russia was friendly to them, although Japan never ceased to entertain suspicions regarding Russia's outward friendship with Japan.

The culmination came when Russia concluded the Russo-German Pact with Germany on August 20, 1939 and war in Europe ensued on August 31 following. Soon after, on September 15, 1939, Russia and Japan agreed to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact between them. This was consummated on April 13, 1941.

The war in Europe changed the aspect of things. Stalin had his own designs in Europe when he sent Hitler to fight the Western Democracies, Britain and France. He knew that as in the Far East where China and Japan could fight and exhaust themselves by fighting with each other, Germany and the Western Democracies would exhaust themselves in fighting with each other if once Hitler is assured of peace on his Russian border. So came the Russo-German Pact to encourage Hitler to fight in the west. Stalin would then have a free hand in the Eastern Europe and he exploited the opportunity in the best manner possible. One state after another was swallowed between September, 1939 and December, 1940. And not only the whole territory of the Tsarist Russia in Europe was recovered, except half of Poland and part of Finland, but new contiguous territories in Rumania were added to the Soviet Republic.

In order to accomplish these aims, Stalin wanted peace in the East. So, regardless of consequences to China, he concluded a five-year Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression

Pact with Japan, the enemy of China. This shattered the faith of G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek in Stalin.

While Stalin was thus toying with China's fate and courting for Japan's neutrality, G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek did not fail to notice that the Russian supplies mainly reached the Chinese Reds or to the Russian legionaries in China. True that Comrade Chou En-Lai, one of the most distinguished of the Chinese Communist leaders, was closely associated with the Government at Nanking and later at Hankow (up to October, 1938) and further inside at Chungking. It is true also that with the Russian aid, the Chinese Reds fought the Japanese valiantly with glowing exploits to their credit. They succeeded in stopping Japanese advance in Shensi. Nevertheless, except in the initial stages of the war after July, 1937, the Chinese Communists who were drawn into the National Army of China as Eighth Route Army and Fourth Route Army, practically acted independently of the General Headquarters at Hankow and Chungking. The Fourth Route Army subsequently created the present crisis as we shall see later. Nevertheless, Comrade Chou En-lai did not merge with the Nationalist Government of China, just in the same manner as the Communist Army actually did not. He was there as if an ambassador of a foreign power. Even the maximum of 200 aeroplanes that were supplied by Russia to China were accompanied by Russian pilots on the ostensible excuse that China had no pilots of her own. But these Soviet Russian pilots and bomber-men remained independent of China's General Headquarters. They formed actually an unit of China's International Legion. But they did not take orders from China's General Headquarters, and obeyed only their own commanders. They did not

even mix with other members from various other countries forming the Legion. G'ssimo Chiang got so much worried and annoyed by this defiance of his orders and breach of discipline that he had to disband the International Legion in 1940. The Soviet airmen were the main cause of this step. They defied the Chinese Government instructions, acted and carried on raids on the positions as they liked and helped to bring about demoralisation and slump in the discipline. This separatist attitude of the Russian airmen must have naturally served as a prototype for the Chinese Communists who were already working and fighting as separate units, and must have further encouraged them in their independence of the Nationalist Government.

The Communist Revolt

The real trouble between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Government began to brew about May 1940, when the former desired to expand their influence in other parts of the country. Shensi, along with adjacent regions, was already sovietised and a small army was enough to keep up the regime. Russia might help there if necessary. Here was, therefore, an opportunity to expand further. Did Stalin inspire this? We cannot say just now. But subsequent events might suggest it. The Chinese Reds asked the Chinese Government to station themselves in the Yangtse Valley, operate from there and carry on guerilla warfare against the Japanese. This means that the Communists now wanted to move in the heart of an important territory of China, which the Chinese Govern-

ment dominated by Kuomintang leaders would not naturally view with favour. Were not these designs to establish Communist sway in the very heart of China? Even with all the co-operation obtained from them by the National Government of China and which might still be obtained from them in future, was it desirable to allow the Reds to capture the heart of China to further Moscow's long-cherished designs on that country? So, the Government refused the Reds to move into the Yangtse Valley. The result was that the Communist Fourth Route Army which was operating in the Anhwei-Nanking-Shanghai area revolted against the Central Government. This army had already been trying to spread its influence in the area on the apparent excuse of fighting the Japanese, and they had already shown signs of independence of the Central Government. But timing the request of the Reds to move into the Yangtse Valley, the Fourth Army showed a distinct flare for independence. If the Eighth Route Army were allowed to move into the Yangtse Valley, then the two armies would have joined, and it was then quite easy to establish one continuous sphere of influence north of Hankow and Ichang, right from Shensi in the west to Shanghai in the east. The whole stretch of the territory would have been Red while the Nationalists would then have remained confined to the south. The revolt was however crushed by G'ssimo, which thwarted further designs of the Communists.

Was there the hand of Stalin behind these happenings? Were the Chinese Communists inspired by him to increase their influence in China? It is perhaps difficult to answer these questions in the affirmative or in the negative. But this much is certain that within a few weeks of these

events, Moscow gave hint of the completion of the Soviet negotiations with Japan for consummating the pact of September 1939. They further stated that—a report of their Tass Agency did—a civil war was inevitable in China. These two hints of apparently friendly attitude of Russia towards Japan were as much directed towards America as towards China, as Japan was already fighting China, and Japan was considered also as the potential enemy of America. The latter was supporting Nationalist China by giving loans and supplies, when the Nationalists and Communists were fighting with each other. America further persuaded Britain to open the Burma Road to China (October, 1940) which was closed by Britain in July preceding in deference to a protest from Japan. America further brought China directly in the Allied circle by admitting China as equal and as one of the Great Powers.

These events mark the beginning of the explosion of the powder magazine gradually charged by the Chinese Reds and the Chinese Nationalists, embers below which were smouldering for years past despite the temporary and apparent rapprochement in the 1937-39 period.

Since then, things have been going from bad to worse, and Moscow's weight has been thrown definitely in favour of the Reds. However, since June 1941, Russia got involved in the European War when Hitler attacked Russia, and for the time being Moscow's attention was diverted to Europe. From that time, Moscow did all it could to give Japan an impression that she was friendly to her; and at the same time China ruled by the Nationalists was not only neglected but was definitely kept under disfavour. Active assistance to the Reds, however, was not possible,

because the battles of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalin-grad were being fought, and Russia wanted every atom of energy and every particle of supplies for her fight on her western front. She herself had to depend upon others for same.

But as soon as the war situation improved on the Western sector of Russia, Moscow was able to turn its attention to the East and resume the game of pulling wires in China.

And America

Japan is a traditional rival of Russia in eastern regions and a capitalistic country, also a competitor in China's markets. America is also a rival, and may in future be perhaps a greater rival than Japan in the same market because of recent American victories over Japan. But America still needs the assistance of Russia to defeat Japan in the East just as she needed Russian assistance to defeat Hitler in the West. This assistance may be given by Russia in the form of loan of Russian air bases and similar facilities to be given to America for hitting at Japan. America would want Russia at least to keep neutral in her war with Japan and to desist from helping Japan in the war against America. Japan, on the other hand, wants to keep Russia friendly so as to be left unmolested in the rear when she is fighting America and Britain in the south. But apparently both Japan and America are friends of Russia. Moscow cannot therefore hit any of them directly. Poor China, a protege of America and also of Britain to some extent has therefore

to be guillotined. The opportune moment has arrived when America, Japan and China could be encompassed by one brilliant stroke of diplomacy. How can this be achieved?

America had angered Moscow by her close partisanship of Nationalist China, and America's help to G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek's Government in the 1940 episodes relating to the Fourth Route and the Eighth Route Communists armies was not forgotten by Moscow. America had also taken a strong stand against Russia in in the latter's aggression on Finland. But that time Stalin was not free to deal with America. However, when America herself got involved in her war with the Axis, it was essential for her to depend on Russia. Russia exploited the situation cleverly and drew as much as possible on America and Britain for supplies and war materials to be used against Hitler. America gladly gave them. But Russian leaders belittled the help; and when in 1943, an American Ambassador commented on it, breaking point was nearly reached. It was averted by timely and suitable whitewashing by White House. The result was increased American aid to Russia in the worst days of Stalingrad. However, now the victory is in sight, and neither American nor British aid is so necessary. Russia has also become self-sufficient. On the contrary both America and Britain require Russia's aid against Japan.

At such a juncture, it is best to begin by first hitting at the weakest, poor China, already harassed by so many years of war. Open breach with America had to be avoided. But America must be curbed and China's market has to be preserved for Russia free from American exploitation. So, America's protege, the Nationalist China

offered a convenient target. Thereby America's partisanship of Nationalist China could well be repaid with interest. Britain also can be tackled thereby, though Britain's aims in China are less marked and her partisanship of China less vociferous.

Propaganda Against Chiang

Consequently in May, 1944, propaganda was set afoot against G'ssimo's Government, taking up the threads from July 1940. The *Pravda* conveniently gives the lead and says that China is not united; that the Nationalists and Communists are fighting with each other; that G'ssimo is not fighting the Japanese; that he is using the British and American arms and ammunitions against the Communists and not against the Japanese; that the authority of the Central Government is not respected by the Provincial warlords who are themselves corrupt and so there is no Central Government in China; China cannot therefore be considered as a Great Power; and if Chiang is the head of that Government, he cannot equally be considered as a "Big" man. And as Chiang is not a "Big" man, he is not fit to sit side by side with the three leaders of their countries—Roosevelt of America, Stalin of Russia and Churchill of Great Britain.

Pravda starts the propaganda apparently voicing the views of the Soviet leaders who never contradicted them. A little earlier G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek was dropped from the Teheran Conference, obviously to please Stalin who attended the Teheran Conference but was not present at Cairo. But now when the war in Europe has taken a

favourable turn for Russia, the process of dropping Chiang was begun in right earnest and openly. Thereby America was snubbed, Britain warned; and in order to disillusion Japan if she interpreted these as friendly gestures, the Chinese Communists were encouraged to fight Japan, G'ssimo Chiang was admonished for not fighting Japan and in the last analysis Stalin bluntly labelled Japan as an "aggressor" nation by alluding to Hong Kong and Pearl Harbour. The last allusion was to sugar-coat the bitter pills given to Britain and America.

Thus by one stroke of diplomacy, America and China were snubbed by lowering down Chiang, and Britain and Japan were warned and yet cajoled.

And curiously the lead given by Stalin was calmly accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill. Both of them seem to have admired and applauded this discreditable—rather disgraceful—performance of Stalin. The foreign correspondents in China got a new angle of vision marked by *Pravda* and they began to look at things through *Pravda's* spectacles. They got a new interpretation of China's conditions which they were, it seems, unable to interpret before, though the conditions in China had not changed. And perhaps, G'ssimo Chiang's new book *China's Destiny* was one of the contributory causes for this change, the main cause being Stalin's far-sighted diplomacy in China. But is it not also possible that with the encouragement of Soviet Russia, the Communists might have been fired with the idea of establishing a Communist State in China, when the Nationalists were weakened in fighting with Japan? Would they not thereby realise their long-standing dream? And thereby wreak their vengeance on Chiang pursuing

them from 1928 to 1935 from Kiangsi to Shensi? Is this not possible? And behind all these, is it not possible that Stalin's diplomacy is at work?

One begins to feel that it may be so. Stalin is now mostly free from European war, and he must begin to think of the future. China has been the focus all along. Will Russia lose to America this single, largest market so close to her? NO. Something must be done. Then the Chinese Communists are there to stage another drama. Why not bring them up to begin the process? So *Pravda* starts the propaganda against China but favouring the Communists, and foreign correspondents in China take up the cue. Stilwell's incident adds fuel to the fire. And Chiang and China are brought down from the high pedestal. But till Russia took the lead in this disgraceful act, there was one continuous effort on the part of the foreign correspondents in China, mainly American, to laud and applaud China and to extol the leadership of Chiang. British leaders were not far behind although they were more cautious.

Not long ago, Churchill dubbed the G'ssimo as the greatest soldier-statesman of Asia of modern times. But Americans raised China and Chiang almost to heaven. The American Magazine *Time* selected and awarded in 1941 its yearly prize to Marshal and Madame Chiang Kai-shek as the outstanding personalities in the world in their respective spheres during 1940. In the same year (1941) *Ta Kung Pao* the leading Nationalist Chinese Daily published in the Chinese language was voted by the Missouri School of Journalism of the University of Missouri in America, as the best foreign newspaper of the year,—an honour which no other Oriental country has ever attained, not even the *Tokyo Asahi* or *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* two of the

most remarkable papers in Japan. Madame Chiang Kai-shek when she visited America was received in the highest circles including President Roosevelt, and she was accorded the highest honours everywhere in America which even visitors like Churchill might envy. She was invited to speak at the Congress—a rare distinction. She was given the highest award as the outstanding woman of the year by the Federation of Women's Clubs of America, in 1941. Even Dr. H. H. Kung, former Finance Minister was received with respect everywhere. He received Honorary Degrees from his American University where he was educated. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was modified and Chinese are now allowed to enter in America on a quota system and to acquire property and American citizenship. Then Chiang was consulted on every point of importance. He was invited to attend the Cairo Conference. And until recently he was dubbed as the great leader of China, and China as a great power.

Were not the foreign correspondents then acquainted with the internal situation as explained by us earlier when they thus helped to boost China to the position of a great power? Has the internal situation in China undergone any serious change after 1937? Did they not know that it was only due to the incentive of the war that unity was forged in China and that it was likely to suffer a set-back if hostilities ceased because of the radical differences between the two opposing ideologies of the Nationalist China and the Communists in China? The fusion has not been made, and it is not likely to be completed in the near future if the war is to end soon. And with definite encouragement to the Communists by Stalin it could never

be completed. Further, *Pravda* and Stalin have actually started the forces of disruption in right earnest.

These facts were known to every keen observer of the Chinese situation. China's unity was not an accomplished fact. It was well on the way. And active war might have helped it further. But, for reasons mentioned above, a stalemate has occurred, and the growing unity had been suffering a set-back since 1939. And despite this fact, the foreign correspondents in China, especially the American, helped to raise China to the position of a first rate power in the world. Everybody talked about it until recently so that nobody had any doubts about it. But when contrary reports are now being sent by them, apparently after *Pravda* took the field openly against China, one cannot be blamed if it is stated that either these reporters had not carefully watched the situation in the past, or that they had suppressed the fact for a definite purpose. Perhaps they had no courage to expose the real situation until *Pravda* had the boldness to do so. Perhaps they depended too much on the *communiques* issued by the Chinese Propaganda offices and they accepted such reports as gospel truth. They did not, perhaps, stop to sift the information and news before transmitting the same abroad. Why were they eager to transmit only such reports as were favourable to China and as may be dished out to them by the Chinese Propaganda organs?

Perhaps that time China was needed as a counter-blast against Japan. That time no proper estimate of Japan's strength could be made, and China's assistance was necessary. And perhaps such boosting was also necessary to keep China from making peace with Japan. So it was necessary to coax China, and this could be done by sweet

words and by according highest deference to Chiang. But now Japan can be tackled without the aid of China. Estimate of Japan's strength can be made. Japan has actually suffered reverses, and Japan can be brought to book without the collaboration of China. Therefore, the conditions in China can now be exposed. Thus, either the reports about the real conditions in China were deliberately suppressed or the foreign correspondents in China had not taken care in the past to study the conditions properly and without bias.

So when *Pravda* starts the calumny, the world press including the foreign correspondents in China echoes it. And Chiang is no longer the great leader nor is China a Great Power!

Stalin's Aims in China

The fact of the matter is that Stalin seems bent upon having a full hand in China. Already Hsingkiang (the Chinese Turkestan) is practically sovietised though nominally under Chiang as the Chinese Province. Outer Mongolia is a Soviet State. Shensi and even Kansu, the north-western provinces of China, are under the Chinese Communists who are practically Stalin's puppets in China with the ideology of Communism. The patriotism of Chinese Communists may not be questioned. But their aim in sovietising China also cannot be questioned. For that purpose, Stalin has already an instrument in China, and by initiating propaganda against Chiang Kai-shek, he can boost the Chinese Communists, and to that extent, he can bring down Chiang.

Herein he seems to have succeeded remarkably well.

Did Churchill get his initiation from Stalin at Moscow? And through him the newspapers in England? America also starts the campaign exactly at the same time. It appears as if a conspiracy is staged to belittle the power and prestige of G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek.

But the fact is that Stalin, when his victories in Europe are in sight, has been turning his attention to the Far East. There he has already a consolidation of strength gathered by the Chinese Communists. With Russia predominantly consolidated in Outer Mongolia, Shensi, Kansu, and Hsing-kiang, a weakened China under Russian influence through the Chinese Reds will not only provide a vast market for Soviet goods, but even the ideology of Communists can take a firm root in the East. With Europe likely to come under his heels, every state in Europe can be made a Soviet and then amalgamated with Soviet Russia as was done with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bessarabia, Ukraine and a part of Finland. Bulgaria and other Slav States in the south-east are bound to Russia by ties of race. They will be friendly to Russia. Stalin's borders in Europe can thus be stretched up to the Rhine. And from there even to France and Spain. Thus the whole of Europe can be brought under Communistic influence, perhaps without England. But England can be tackled later, even cornered, and the capitalism of England destroyed.

When these aims are being accomplished on the Western front, Stalin can simultaneously turn his attention to the eastern borders of Russia.

Once he has set his mind on it, then excuse must be found for the interference in the various countries of the

East on the plea of self-defence. For that purpose his *Pravda* is there to start the propaganda. Lowering of China is begun and therewith of Chiang. If world opinion is changed against China by such means, then the support of America and Britain can be gradually reduced, and China would be again reduced to a state of weakness. She would then be a prey to this Sphinx through the instrumentality of the Communist bands in China who are now practically his fifth columnists there. China can then be sovietized, and the country can also provide a market for the Russian products—the vastest single market of 450 million people. The war has brought about tremendous increase in the productive capacity of Russia. The factories are at present engaged in the production of war materials for the major part, that is about 75 per cent. to 80 per cent. But as soon as the war stops, most of these factories are likely to be idle. Will it not then lead to unemployment in Russia? How are the workers to be supported? Other world markets are practically closed to Russia being flooded with European and American goods. Many other countries are producing their own goods. And therefore undeveloped China presents the best opportunity. All peace time machinery produced in Russia can be sent to China for development. Other products of comforts and luxury can also be thrown to the populace which is denied these during the war times. And thus the wheels of waggons and machinery can be kept moving in Russia. China has got vast known deposits of coal, and even iron deposits are traced. Oil shells are found in some places and even that asset can be developed.

Thus, not only the wheels and waggons of Russia itself can be kept moving, but even large industries can be

started in Sovietised China under Russian influence and with Russian capital. Then the vast production can be sold not only in China, but even in other world markets at rates cheaper than those at which similar products are sold by the capitalistic countries like Britain and America. This cheapness will be made possible by regimenting all labour in China on Communistic basis, which can successfully compete with the high-paid labour in England and America. By thus regulating more than one-third of the population of the world—China's 450 millions and Russia's 200 millions—and making them produce cheaply, Russia can sell the products also cheaply in the world markets and thereby help to destroy the whole fabric of other capitalist and imperialist countries in economic and political matters. And what is politics today but economics? The one who has got at his disposal powerful economic means can mould his politics as he pleases and therewith he can mould even the politics and the destinies of other nations as well. Thus Russia, under the garb of Communism, can become a predominantly capitalistic country exploiting cheap labour mainly in China. There would be no difference whatsoever then between any known capitalistic country and the so-called Communistic Russia. As a matter of fact, once any country launches upon large-scale production, employment of labour, and production of articles with a view to earning profit, it cannot be anything but capitalistic, by whatever other name it may be known.

It is thus that the spread of Russian influence in China can benefit both the Russian people and their Communistic ideology. Lenin's aim of world revolution through Communism can be brought nearer when the large popula-

tion of China is brought under Communistic influence. The path of Communism will then be clear for such further advance as may be desired. We have shown this by quoting Nathaniel Peffer earlier in this book.

It may therefore be reasonably concluded that these thoughts are not lost upon Stalin, and it is in his interest to have a free hand in China.

Russia and Japan

For that purpose, there is on the one hand the vilification of Chiang and China, and on the other hand a gradual condemnation of Japan. Today Japan is labelled aggressor. Tomorrow another wordy warfare. Then diplomatic moves sometimes backed by force; then a show that Stalin is backing America and Britain. Then, if necessary, a threat of war by staging a showdown against Japan. These will be the stages on which Stalin's moves against Japan will proceed. But we do not think that actual war will be declared by Stalin on Japan. He hopes to get everything by just holding out threats of war, or by making a show of helping the enemies of Japan. He can promise air bases to Britain and America in Siberia from where Japan can be bombed. He can promise to provide submarine bases in the Siberian waters. And even such mere promises can win from Japan several concessions. Japan is in the most critical position today in all her history of 2604 years. Just to survive at least within her own islands, she may concede anything to Russia to keep her quiet, at least to prevent her actually entering into the war on the side of the Allies. Japan will try to prevent even the grant of concessions by Russia to

America and Britain; and in the bargain Russia can exact any concession that she may want from Japan.

For instance, Russia can get back the southern half of Sakhalin Island which was ceded to Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05. Russia can cancel all the concessions then granted to Japan in the northern half of Sakhalin including oil concessions. Russia can get back the Chinese Eastern Railway built by Russia and sold to Japan in 1935. Russia can demand the cession of Liaoning peninsula in Manchuria including Dalny (Dairen) and Port Arthur which province was held by Russia till 1904 on a 25-years lease from China. When Japan is in the worst of conditions, Stalin can ask Japan even to withdraw entirely from China, Manchuria and Korea. In short, Russia can ask Japan to restore the *status quo ante* 1904 without fighting. Russia may even occupy, without consulting Japan, the southern half of Sakhalin, the Liaoning Peninsula and the Chinese Eastern Railway when Japan will be locked up in a life and death struggle with Britain and America. There are precedents for these statements. Stalin occupied one state after another in Europe which were parts of the Russian territory before 1917, when Germany was engaged in the war with England and France in September, 1939. Latvia, Estonia, Luthuania, Bessarabia, and parts of Poland and Finland were again brought within the Russian territory. What then prevents Stalin from repeating his performance in the East? And his first utterance against Japan, calling her an "aggressor nation", is a hint to Japan and an indication of the policy that he will pursue in the East.¹

¹ Since writing this, Russia has given notice of terminating the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 1941.

American Interests in China

In adopting this policy in China and the Far East generally, Stalin has another aim. He intends to keep off America from China and the Far East generally. If America, as a result of her victory over Japan, secures a predominant position in China, then the Chinese markets will be virtually lost by Russia. At least America can be a serious competitor to Russia. Before the Sino-Japanese War in 1931, Japan's share in the foreign trade of China was 24 per cent while that of America was hardly 8 per cent. But, as a result of the war and of the Chinese boycott of the Japanese goods, America's share was pushed up to 20 per cent in 1932 and 1933 and Japan's share was brought down to less than 8 per cent. On the slackening of the boycott after 1934, and after the resumption of the trade with Japan, partial though it was, the high-priced American goods were again pushed aside by the Japanese goods despite American loans in the form of wheat and despite complete acquisition of China's wood oil by American interests. And American goods were practically eliminated after Japan's further advance in China after July 1937.

Thus both these processes—one of pushing America to the first position in China's foreign trade when Japanese goods were boycotted, and the second when the American share was reduced to a trifle after 1934 when Japanese goods could be sold in China, and later when Japan occupied important trade centres of China even before actual war between Japan and America started in December, 1941—have convinced America that elimination of Japan from the Chinese markets would open up

a great vista for American products. The questions, therefore, which will surely present themselves to Russia in the post-war period, will face America too. How are the huge factories to be kept busy? How to avoid unemployment? Central and South America alone cannot provide the markets for American goods. China and India must be brought under influence for the purpose. In India Americans can secure this by the present Lend-and-Lease policy and other means. In China, they can do it by eliminating Japan. Victory over Japan is in sight. It may take some time more; but sooner or later Japan will have to withdraw from China because of Allied victory over Japan. And then America can have a predominant say in matters in China. American goods, American scientists, American advisers would find their way to that undeveloped, war-torn, war-weary and half-starved country.

Stalin's Technique

Stalin knows this. But while Americans are trying to secure the advantage in China by fighting and ousting Japan, Stalin has his own consummate methods to secure the same advantage by a technique tried and perfected on his Western Front in Europe. By these methods, he can get every advantage there when others are fighting. By his Non-Aggression Pact with Germany on August 21, 1939, he allowed Germany to fight France and Britain, while he got back all the former territory of Russia which was she lost after 1917. In fact, he wanted and had actually anticipated that situation to arise when he signed the Pact with Germany. He was just waiting for the

opportunity after the war started on August 31, 1939. And as soon as it did, he got busy over his job. The same technique he can employ in the East. While America and Britain are engaged in war with Japan, he can get back all the Russian territory and concessions from Japan, which the latter had snatched away from Russia as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. More. He can go even further, and can now get from Japan and China what Russia did not possess even before 1904. Russian designs on Manchuria and Korea, for a long time before 1904, are well-known. In fact, it was this policy of Russia that led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 in which she was outpointed. Her designs were frustrated and her wish remained unfulfilled.

But now is the opportunity for revenge. Now is the chance for obtaining what she could not obtain in 1902. Russia can now obtain all the concessions without fighting for them when others are fighting for her. Russia wants an ice-free port where navigation is possible throughout the year. She tried for Chemulpo (Fusan) in Korea, though this port is not entirely ice-free throughout the year. She tried for Port Arthur and Dalny (Dairen) in Manchuria. In fact, the latter two were actually obtained by her on a 25-years lease from China. She did not get the first (Fusan) and lost the second as a result of Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. She can now not only get them back, but also the whole of Korea and Manchuria can be brought under the influence of Russia by her peremptorily asking Japan to withdraw from them. Russia may get these concessions for the mere asking when Japan is in a bad way. And Japan can ill-afford to refuse if she has to save her own skin; for, a triple

attack on Japan by America, Britain and Russia, will mean either destruction of Japan or her reduction to a state of vassalage from which she will hardly recover for years to come. Japan, therefore, will very likely accept, as a matter of emergency and strategy to stave off immediate disaster, most of the demands of Russia, and may give peaceful possession of such of the territories and ports as may be asked by Russia. Japan may hope to tackle Russia at a later date.

Russia in Japan's Shoes

Russia can thus step into Japan's shoes in China, Manchuria and Korea, while America and Britain would still be fighting Japan.

But other effects of Russia acquiring a predominant position in the eastern and north-eastern regions of China will be far-reaching. Such a position will mean encirclement of China proper by Communistic influences on three sides—in the west through Hsingkiang, in the north through Outer Mongolia and in the east through Manchuria and Korea. This will enable Russia to realise her long-cherished dream (since 1923 at least) to convert China into a Communistic State. In the west, the process is already on the way; in the north Inner Mongolia can be converted into a Soviet State and incorporated into the Soviet Union. Then Korea's independence may be acknowledged; but there will be predominant Soviet influence to start with, and then gradually the whole of the country can be brought within the orbit of the Soviet Republic. In the beginning, Korea may have a Republic and it may be gradually modelled on the Soviet pattern.

Russian advisers to the Republic will be introduced. Korean trade and industry will be controlled. Korean puppets will be created and through them the entire political and economic fabric of Korea will be made to subserve the interests of Soviet Russia. Several Koreans are already in Russia, some are in America and several others in Free China. But with Russia acquiring a dominating position in the East, it would be no wonder if Korea is gradually pocketed in the cockpit of the Soviet Russian politics by methods which are 100 per cent. imperialistic and of which Stalin is a clever master.

In Manchuria, Russia as successor to Japan will accede to all those privileges and concessions which Japan has been enjoying so far. Thus, Russian advisers will replace the Japanese in every department. All mining and industrial concerns will be under Russian control. All exports and imports of Manchuria will be regulated by Russia. And every other activity will be promoted, undertaken, encouraged or discouraged only in conformity with Russian interests.

Time for dealing with Manchuria will be ripe when the Japanese Islands proper will be attacked (and when Germany is crushed).¹ It is true that the Japanese soldiers in China will fight to the last man to maintain their position. It is also possible that Japan might give the real fight to America and Britain on Chinese territory, on the mainland of Asia. But if Russia is free from European entanglement, and Japan is hard pressed at home and in China by America and Britain,

¹ Since this was written Germany has surrendered and Allied planes have started pounding Japanese home-islands, which are being put in readiness for defence against invasion.

then it is likely that Japan might withdraw some soldiers from China for home defence by accepting Russian demands. So at that time Russia can avoid the necessity of actual war with Japan in order to get what she wants from Japan. And Manchuria will be one of the most valuable possessions for Soviet Russia, even more valuable than Korea, and thereby the Russian position will be permanently strengthened with ice-free ports in the east all the year round.

And it is more than probable that Russia can acquire all this without firing a shot at Japan. By mere wordy warfare, by diplomatic manœuvring and by merely holding out a threat of war, Russia, would not only regain what she lost in 1905, but would also acquire for herself a dominant position in Far Eastern affairs together with more territory, which neither Britain nor America will dispute for some time to come. Stalin has already started the campaign which is a clear hint to Japan of his designs in the Far East and a shadow of the things to come from Russia. If Japan does not yield to such threats peacefully, Russia might think of action. And if action is needed, Russia will keep herself prepared for it. This preparation might induce Japan to yield.

Japan as a Buffer

However, it should not be for a moment thought that Stalin will like Japan to be completely crushed by America and Britain so as not to be able again to stand up against them. That will not be to the interest of Russia. Stalin will like Japan to remain only strong enough to

resist any serious American or British demands. In clear words, Russia will like Japan to serve as a buffer or a vehicle or a bridge between Communistic Russia and Capitalistic America and Britain, for some time at least. Stalin may further have Pacific ambitions. And the continuance of the war between Japan and America will be to his interest. The more the war is prolonged, the better for his interests when he is not actually in it. If he enters the war against Japan, the war may end soon, and then both Britain and America as well as China and Japan will be free. Stalin would not then remain in the key position that he is in today which is the best position for him for bargaining purposes. So in any future emergency, even after the present war is over, Japan may be provoked to deal with America. During such a period, Russia can further obtain what she wants without herself fighting. Stalin will not therefore like American borders or spheres coming nearer his own for the time being. For that purpose, it is necessary to have Japan as a buffer on the one hand, and on the other hand to take up the position of Japan in China. Thereby America can be kept at arms length. Consequently, Russia will see to it that Japan is only so much weakened as to be dependent on Russia for the most part and even her (Japan's) independence will be at the sufferance of Russia. Of course, the Japanese are proud people and they would prefer death to a dependent existence. They may accept Russian demands only as an emergency step and await a favourable turn in international affairs. People, who in their own country will not tolerate their own Ministers who may be inattentive and unalert to Japan's own interests or those who may appear

to favour foreign countries out of policy, will not brook an indefinite surveillance under Russia. But just as a drowning man catches at a straw, so if and when America and Britain succeed to such an extent as to bring Japan near to complete collapse and defeat, Japan might do everything to keep Russia neutral. At such a critical juncture, Japan might accept any Russian demands to buy off her neutrality so as to prevent Russia actively helping the Allies by participating in the war. In short, Russia can assume the position of a non-belligerent ally of Britain and America against Japan, or at least hold out a threat to Japan to become one.

Thus, Stalin can acquire what he may want from Japan. Japan's complete withdrawal from China and Manchuria may be one of the conditions. Or, as the first step, partition of China between Russia and Japan may be mooted. And thus Russia can gradually turn tables on Japan for the latter's attitude towards her till 1942.

China, A Corner Stone

Thus, from every point of view, whether to oppose Japan or to befriend her; whether to humiliate her or to use her as a buffer; whether to ward off America from China or from the Far East or to prevent Britain from regaining a foothold in the Far East; whether to propagate Communism in those regions or elsewhere, Russia needs China as an important springboard for world domination. Russia's designs on China are historical, and the change-over to Soviet regime from the old Tsarist regime made no difference in the Russian policy towards China—a policy of grabbing China's territories or controlling

the destinies of that great and ancient country. Does anyone think that Stalin has not the same dream of world domination as other nations, like Japan, have? The Soviets have it since 1919. Formerly there was an ideology. But with Stalin it is economics. Whereas in former days the Reds wanted to dominate the world through the ideology of Communism by propagating it throughout the world, Stalin now would do it by controlling the economic resources of the world. In that process China is the corner stone. A nation that can control China can control the whole world. If the Chinese do it—and they would ultimately do it—they would control the world. One single nation and one single market of 450 millions people with one universal language for the whole country! Who will resist the temptation? Britain and other European powers coveted it. Tsarist Russia coveted it. Red Russia is ceaselessly trying for it. All American diplomacy is directed towards it. And Japan has staked her all on it, even her very existence as a nation. How can Stalin therefore rise above it? China is so contiguous to Russian territory. China appears almost as a limb and the two right legs of the Russian Bear standing erect and looking eastward. China therefore must be controlled at any cost. And here is the most opportune moment. The mission of Tsarist Russia which remained unfulfilled so long can now be realised by Soviet Russia. For that purpose, the known imperialistic methods have to be employed, such as, divide and rule, creation of puppets, fault-finding with the internal administration, isolating the victim from friends from whom assistance is possible, dollar diplomacy, guns if necessary, discrediting the name

and prestige of the victim by any means whatever, and lately, the most modern method of propaganda.

Stalin has been employing all these. He has succeeded in fanning the feud between the Communists and the Nationalists by shifting the Communists to the Russian borders and playing the game from there. He has on occasions cajoled China with dollars and supplies; he has been now carrying on a vigorous propaganda against China for disunity and bad internal administration. He has also succeeded in alienating from China the sympathies of America and Britain. And thus he has prepared the field for his own diplomatic offensive against China which he may later back by force if necessary. The situation *vis-a-vis* Japan is now favourable to him and he is getting practically free from entanglement with Germany in Europe. He has therefore played his card in the East, and that too with finesse, and has succeeded in collaring both Roosevelt and Churchill. Thereby, he has brought down Chiang from the "Big Four" and China from one of the Great Powers.

This landslide of China and lowering of Chiang were the necessary first step for Russia's realisation of her dreams in that country and in the Far East generally. Stalin has won the first hurdle by alienating American and British sympathies from China. He can now accomplish the rest by gradual and cleverly-laid stages of which he is the master. And he would no doubt fulfil his aims if other parties interested do not wake up in time. Of the "Big Three" now left, Stalin is in a dominant position and he will use it for furthering nationalism in Russia and propagating Communism abroad. Commun-

ism has no more use for Russia itself. It may well act as a disruptive force abroad, as it is doing in China, by creating cleavage and class conflicts in other countries. In Russia it has reverted to full-fledged nationalism. And even the last vestige of internationalism was removed when, in 1943, Stalin closed the Third International *sine die*. In Russia itself, either Communism is made national, or Nationalism has taken the place of Communism. The latter is more obvious.

Soviet Russia As Liberator?

And if any misguided people have still been labouring under the illusion that Soviet Russia is the liberator of the world, the preserver of the rights of the common people, the precursor of peace to the oppressed humanity and giver of the raj of the common people, let them study Stalin's determined policy towards Poland, the kidnapping by Soviet Agents of the Polish officials and Polish Mission said to be not friendly to Soviet Russia, the creation of a rival Government at Lublin in Poland, when the real Polish Government was functioning in London, the loot of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and parts of Finland, Bessarabia and other territories by depriving the people of those countries of their freedom and bringing them within the Soviet Union; and latest of all the vigour with which Iran is pursued for a share in her oil production. This is, of course, besides what is happening in China. In all these and similar acts, there is imperialism galore. In Russia, Communism has given way to vigorous and, sometimes, even rabid nationalism when

dealing with other people. And in the matter of imperialistic advances in others' territories, Soviet Russia has outpointed known imperialistic and capitalistic countries.

And yet I am surprised to find that some men in this country still have blind faith in the so-called "deliverer of the oppressed peoples of the world." Societies like "Friends of the Soviet Union" still exist in this country. In the first place, Stalin does not require the friendship of slaves, that is, of people who are slaves in their own countries. What is the value of the friendship of slaves to him? Often, a weak man is a liability on the strong. So Stalin does not need the friendship of the Indians. These Indians would do well therefore to be friends of India first, and copy in India the nationalism of Soviet Russia. And secondly, Soviet Russia has not proved that she is the deliverer of the oppressed humanity she elsewhere poses to be. If at all deliverance has come to any nation, it is only by subjugation of those countries for the benefit of Soviet Russia. Thus, Russia has not fulfilled even that mission of deliverance, although she vociferously professes it. And now there is nothing but nationalism rampant in Russia. No one can therefore look to Russia for guidance. If any one does, it will be only for enslaving one's own country to Soviet Russia. Our friends of the Soviet Union, therefore, should divert their attention to copying the nationalism of Soviet Russia. India would be benefited thereby. This now is the true colour of Soviet Russia. Of course I admire the role that Communism has played in Russia. But it is now inevitably giving place to Nationalism. And in her dealings with other countries, it is not the catholic principle of Communism but of Nationalism that prevails with the Soviet Union. It is there-

fore all Nationalism and Imperialism pure and simple, unalloyed and unmixed, and more vigorous than the older imperialisms elsewhere.

And China has become the victim of that imperialism thirsting for world domination. In this process of victimisation, Chiang had therefore to be dropped from the "Big Four" as the first step. Therewith China is brought down from the pedestal of a Great Power.

Consequences of Russian Ascendancy

The consequences of Russia's predominant position in China, thus acquired, will be:—

1. China would go Communist.
2. While Russia has become Nationalist, China's Nationalism will be extinguished and all the work of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, for the last 50 years, for raising China to the position of a strong, first-rate nation and world power, will be destroyed.
3. China will play only second fiddle to Soviet Russia.
4. China will remain only a market for Russian finished products and a supplier of raw materials for Russian factories in China.
5. China will be ruled from Moscow through Russian advisers and military experts.
6. China would serve Russia as a springboard for the spread of Communism in Indo-China, Thailand, Philippines, Malaya, Burma and even India.
7. India will be the next objective of Soviet Russia, unless there is a waiver clause in the Twenty Years

Russo-British Non-Aggression Pact of 1942 to keep India out of the operation of Soviet Russia and China out of the operation of Great Britain.

But one cannot be quite sure that Stalin would keep his promise if circumstances require the abrogation of the Pact earlier.

8. As the predominant power in China, Soviet Russia will just walk into Manchuria and Korea.
9. Japan can be brought within the sphere of Soviet influence, if Japan is not completely humbled already by Russia joining Britain and America as an actual belligerent against Japan.
10. Practically the whole of Asia will then be under Soviet influence. The process will be almost automatic.
11. America and Britain will be excluded from Asia with the possible exception of India.
12. Most of Europe can be controlled from Moscow as the stage is already set for it.
13. England and France will be reduced to second-rate powers and will have to take "advice" from Soviet Russia from time to time.
14. Ultimately, both of them will go under Soviet influence if not actually under Soviet control.
15. With Europe and Asia under Soviet control, Africa, which is practically under European powers, will be at the mercy of Soviet Russia.
16. The United States of America will then be a second-rate power, and will have to depend upon Soviet

Russia on any matters affecting Europe, Asia and Africa.

17. Gradually Soviet Russian influence will be extended to America and Australia. Thereby the process of world domination will be completed as the whole of Antarctica will follow suit.
18. Soviet Russia will then be the most predominant power in the world.
19. Iran and Turkey will be the immediate victims in the south and south-west.
20. The work of Lenin will be completed and the aim of Tsarist Russia will be accomplished.
21. But it may lead to a war on Russia by Britain and America combined. And also by Japan, if Japan remains sufficiently strong after this war.

If anyone has doubts about this inevitable development, let him study the progress of Russia only since 1939. Would any one have then predicted that Russia would be in the present position? Stalin is practically dictating to Churchill and Roosevelt today. No one would have imagined this in 1939, especially after Russia's bad show in her war with Finland in December, 1939. But to-day Russia is the dispenser of the destinies of all the States up to the borders of France in Europe, and Stalin has the fate of Japan in Asia in the palm of his hand. He has a clearly predominant position in all the territories surrounding China, except in Manchuria and Korea. But he can now easily acquire a similar position in Manchuria and Korea as well as in China by stopping Japan through Britain and America and by stopping G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek through the Chinese Communists. Let people

then imagine the logical and inevitable consequences of this position of Soviet Russia, which she has acquired within the course of just five years. Then the whole panorama of the future moves as stated above will be unfolded to them in all its vivid colours.

Be Careful

We may not have viewed this expansion with alarm if the aims of Soviet Russia were genuinely peaceful and philanthropic, designed to relieve the oppressed peoples of the world from imperialistic domination. But it is not so. Her past performance does not warrant the belief. It is all a game of subjugation and of replacing the present imperialist regimes over those peoples by the young and vigorous imperialism of Soviet Russia. All the countries so far "relieved" have been neatly swallowed by Soviet Russia and people of those countries have been duly "relieved" of power in their own countries, whatever outward form of independence they may have adopted. The Soviet intentions are not philanthropic nor are their methods clean as alleged and professed by Soviet Reds and their henchmen elsewhere. It is all a matter of serving the ends of Russia. Even the latest Soviet performances in various parts of the world, in Europe as well as in Asia, give clear indications of this. Hark! Look at the deeds of Russia on her eastern and western borders! See Russia's violent attacks on Iran! See the treatment of Poland today and similar acts elsewhere! In the course of five years, Russia did not hesitate to make pacts with the capitalist and imperialist countries like Japan, America and Britain, and a Fascist country like

Germany whenever it suited its purpose to do so. Where remains then the vaunt (or boost?) of communism or anti-imperialism or anti-capitalism? Let the significance of these happenings and moves be clearly understood. It would be well for the world if people understand this early. Disillusionment is necessary for the future good of the world. Here in India, some have even gone to the length of accepting whatever Russia does as right; and whatever she does not do, as wrong. To them the war became a "people's war" as soon as Russia was forced to enter the European war against Germany. Before that, it was an imperialist war. As soon as the war became "people's war", then co-operation is offered to the Government to fight it. Till Russia joined in the war, the Government of India did not deserve their co-operation. But "Russia" is such a magical name for them that immediately she joins the conflict the enemies become friends, imperialists become communists, the wicked become saints and even darkness becomes light!

Stalin is not a dictator to them. He is just a leader, and a just leader, at that! Although he has "liquidated" more rivals and opponents than those liquidated by all other known dictators, they think he is not a dictator, much less a ruthless dictator. The figures of those thus "liquidated" by him are moderately put at 20,000! And yet Stalin is a saint. Apology will of course be found that this was needed for the larger interests of Russia. But the same apology can be given on behalf of Hitler and Mussolini. In fact, they had given it. What is the difference then between Stalin and the other dictators when they put down rivals and any opposition to their doctrines or authority? And yet like the king, Stalin

can do no wrong. His pursuing of Trotsky and Trotsky's ultimate murder in far off Mexico where he was passing his last days in peace and from where he could not have plotted to overthrow Stalin's strongly entrenched regime, are the basest and wickedest examples of Stalin's ruthless dictatorship. And yet some of our misguided youths and even elders acclaim Stalin as the saviour !

This same M. Joseph Stalin has been responsible for the cashiering of G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek to boost the Communists in China and thus to make way for his expansion and influence in China. And unless the Chinese Communists deliberate calmly over the inner motives of Stalin and clear their decks for unity in China, they will only succeed in enslaving their country to Soviet Russia. Stalin's aims are clear. World domination is the end. And China is the corner stone of that policy adopted ever since the Reds assumed power in Moscow, especially since 1919.

Consequences of Chiang's Omission

Now let us visualise the consequences on the East generally of this drop of G'ssimo Chiang from the "Big Four". How the East and the interests of the people are affected thereby.

Let us summarise:—

1. The world will be dominated for the present by the Three Big Powers—America, Britain and Soviet Russia,—amongst whom the smaller nations of the East will have no say. And ultimately only Soviet Russia will dominate the world.

2. The European and American powers which have colonies, dependencies and/or possessions in the East will continue to possess and to control them, even though some of them had lost their own countries in Europe and are propped up on the support of the Big Three.
3. This will be resented in the East; and this marked preference for the white people to rule over the coloured people in the East by preserving their *status quo*, despite the aims of the present war, will prepare a stage for "colour dispute" and perhaps an eventual colour war in the next few years.
4. G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek now not being a "Big One" will not carry influence at San Francisco Conference and/or any other Peace Conference that may be held to plan the new world after the war. And this question of the colonies of the European powers in the East is likely to be shelved.
5. This relegation of Chiang to a back number is a slur and a slight on the East and is tantamount to the reduction of the East to a secondary or tertiary position in the world.

G'ssimo Chiang should not have been raised to the position of the "Big Four" without first assessing the conditions in China. But any way, having done so, it would have been decent to maintain him on the level. It does not behove leaders like Roosevelt and Churchill to jettison an ally, who had full faith in them, to please Stalin who obviously has been responsible for this drop. Apparently, the latter must have objected to raising Chiang to the position of a "Big One" and must have insisted on

or manoeuvred his demotion. This is clear from the fact that Chiang was left out of all conferences which were attended by Stalin. In fact, Stalin and his *Pravda* had been carrying on a campaign against Chiang since the time America helped Chiang to be raised to the position of a "Big One" and China to the position of a great power.

6. If G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek has not the same dominant voice as the other Big Three at the Conferences, then it is feared that there may be only White hegemony in the post-war world and another world war may not be avoided.
7. If the European powers are not going to restore their colonial possessions and dependencies in the East to the sons of the soil, then Japan may take up the same stand at the Peace Conferences and may not like to give up similar possessions which she has acquired in the Far East since 1894.
8. In that case, only force will have to be used to dispossess Japan of such gains. Is that to be done also in the case of colonial possessions of the Euro-American Powers?
9. The people in the East were greatly impressed by the war aims of the Allied Nations, which included the safeguarding of the rights, independence and sovereignties of smaller nations. They had clung to the hopes raised by such documents as the Atlantic Charter and other declarations from America and Britain. But this abandoning of the "greatest soldier-statesman of Asia", as Chiang was described by Churchill only yesterday, will throw a wet blanket on those hopes. This war will have

been fought in vain if the faith of the Eastern peoples is shattered.

10. In China the Communists will have obtained the upper hand and Russia will practically rule the place.
11. The Far East will revert to the days of 1840-1900 when there was scramble for power amongst the European and American nations in that field.
12. This might lead to a war between them staged in the Far East.
13. Defeated Japan and suppressed China might begin to realise their past indiscretion towards each other and strive for neighbourly unity and amity in future. They may mould the destinies of the Far East in times to come.
14. But in the meantime, economic exploitation of the East by Euro-American powers will go on in full swing.

These will be the main effects of the elimination of G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek from the "Big Four". The result is already being felt; but as time goes on it will be disastrous. We have actually tried to minimise the seriousness of these effects. But in reality the danger will be greater. I for one, feel strongly that Chiang could and should have been spared the humiliation of being ignored, after having been first included among the "Big Four". Admitted that China is not industrially, politically or commercially developed sufficiently to be classed with America and Britain. But surely, if this was not Chiang's qualification for inclusion among the hierarchy of world

powers, his subsequent ousting from it can only be described as bad taste, bad manners and bad diplomacy. What will be his position in his own country in view of this grave loss of face? Will his provincial warlords, his people and the Communist armies obey him? Will they not begin to challenge his authority? All this may serve only to shatter the unity of the Chinese people and the authority of the Central Government. The forces of disruption will begin to appear, and the process of unification of the country and its rise as a first class power will have suffered a serious set-back. Perhaps that was intended. And Chiang's fall from the leadership might accomplish it. Propaganda was therefore set afoot to lower Chiang's prestige as the first step. By lowering his prestige, disunity and disobedience to his authority will follow. Then these will be used as arguments to prove that Chiang is not the leader of his country nor China a united nation. Disunity and lack of central authority in China thus caused would then serve Stalin as the excuse for interference there. Excuses are already found in that the Nationalist (Kuomintang) have formed a clique led by Chen Brothers, that the Soong family is ruling China and all the rest.

The Kuomintang

But in what countries do such cliques or even a few strong personalities not wield absolute power, especially in war times? Such absolute power is often necessary when unification of a country is desired. Bismarck unified Germany with an iron hand. Chiang has to do likewise in China; and for the last twenty years he has been strain-

ing every nerve to accomplish it. I know some of the Kuomintang members are medieval-minded with feudal tendencies. Some of them have not yet fully imbibed the principles of democracy. It is true also that some of them take criticism of their official and public acts as personal and pursue the critics with vindictiveness. There is corruption too, rampant amongst officials and other ranks. All this is admitted. But can you expect anything better in a period of transition from medievalism to modernism, from autocracy to democracy, and from age to youth? The older generation must pass away and the younger one must take its place. Evolution rather than revolution must be the rule. The old traditions must be completely left behind and the new ones must be developed. And this is being done in China. I have been a witness to these changes for an unbroken period of ten most exciting years—1931 to 1941—and have taken part in journalism, business and public life in that country. I have watched the true spirit of nationalism and democracy being gradually developed. This gradual and evolutionary process would be more beneficial to China than any other. Otherwise the evolution of democracy may suffer a revulsion as it did in 1915, when Yuan Shi-Kai wanted to be Emperor of China after the revolution of 1911 which was staged to overthrow monarchy and to establish a republic. The shape of Nationalism in China is thus gradually being hammered out. The Kuomintang members, with all their defects, are not less patriotic or less nationalist, than the Communists. It is they who have kept up China's war against Japan for so many years. Japan hates them and directs all attack against them. As true Nationalists, just as they have been keen on keeping off Japan from China,

they are also keen on keeping off Russia from China. China is in that unfortunate position of being in the path of the eastward expansion of Soviet Russian imperialism and the westward expansion of the Japanese imperialism. Both imperialisms are now young and vigorous directed towards China and jockeying for a predominant position there, while China is just emerging from mediævalism. But before she could fully modernise and build up her internal fabric, China was caught between these two blades of the scissors. The Nationalists are fully aware of this. They are afraid that the policy and actions of the Chinese Communists might introduce and later entrench Soviet Russia firmly in China. Consequently Soviet Russia will surely not regard with any degree of favour the opposition of the Nationalists to Soviet expansion in China through Chinese Communists.

Communism Glorified !

Here therefore is the radical, the polar difference between the outlooks of the Nationalists and the Communists. Here is the crux of the whole matter. This is the bone of contention. And the Chinese Communists backed by Russia have, or to put it more bluntly, Russia through the instrumentality of the Chinese Communists has, succeeded remarkably well in pulling down Chiang and reducing China to a third-rate power. Britain and America have acquiesced in it. And the irony of the situation is that those very countries viz. Britain and America, which have condemned Communism all along and which would not like to be contaminated by it themselves, have been fondling and hugging the Chinese Com-

munists to their bosoms with an abundance of enthusiasm and exuberance of heart. Their sympathies for the Communists are overflowing while the Nationalists are not in favour. Newspapers in those and other countries, besides, of course, in Soviet Russia have been so magnifying the role of the Communists that the latter seem to them as the only saviours of China. All Dr. Sun Yat-sen's work is forgotten and G'ssimo Chiang is made to appear as an enemy, a traitor to his country—a leader who has suffered untold miseries, rebuffs and insults for the national cause, who has resigned several times from high posts and yet shouldered again those onerous responsibilities as a duty towards his country and countrymen because no one could replace him! For the last twenty years, he has toiled ceaselessly for unifying the country as the first step to raise China to the front rank in the family of nations. He has stubbornly and steadfastly kept up the war against Japan for the last 15 years. And yet today he is made to appear an enemy of his country. He is in disgrace. And everyone advises him to settle with and placate the Communists, just as they tell the Indian National Congress to settle with the Muslim League. But this unwanted advice only serves to encourage the Communists, who then pitch their demands higher still, and thus Chiang's efforts to settle the question amicably have been foiled so far. After every appeasement, the demands are put higher, so that no solution can ever be effected. Chiang has made this clear in his speeches several times.

Does anyone then think that foreigners know the conditions in and interests of China better than Chiang or better even than the maligned members of the Kuomintang Party? Does any one think that the Communists are the

only patriotic people in China? Has Chiang's devotion to his country which dates back to 1911 suddenly disappeared? Why then should foreigners arrogate to themselves the right of teaching the Chinese Nationalists the right path? Are they less patriotic? The only explanation as has been said for Chiang's 'show-down' is that the Chinese Communists backed by Moscow do not relish the endeavour of the Nationalists led by Chiang to prevent Russia displacing Japan in China! Hence Chiang is to be removed from the scene. And the first step towards it is to throw him down from the eminence to which America had raised him. Let people think of this. It is a sad drama, a saga of selfish power politics, a shameless performance staged against a great country with illustrious traditions. And China has the potentiality of becoming the biggest country in the world one day, bigger than America, bigger than Britain and bigger even than Russia. But perhaps, this prospect is not pleasant to them.

So is being enacted on the Far Eastern stage a tragedy of far-reaching ramifications. Therein the part of the villain is being played not by Roosevelt, not even by Churchill, but by the cold-blooded Machiavellian diplomat, Stalin. Chiang's head is demanded and therewith the grabbing of China. Control of China is necessary as the first step in world domination. And this control can be secured by removal of Chiang from the scene. Churchill and Roosevelt have practically remained silent spectators of this drama. They need Stalin's assistance in the west to crush Hitler, and in the east to crush Japan. He is therefore to be propitiated at all costs. Every act of his is to be condoned, applauded and supported, little realising how this connivance and encouragement is going

to affect them in time to come. Apart from this, do they realise how deeply the people of the East have been affected by this jettisoning of Chiang from amongst the "Big Four"? Chiang, the only leader of a great and free oriental country who by his remarkable leadership for 20 years, has laid a claim to be one of the highest ranking leaders of the world to sit side by side with other great world leaders. Incidentally, he is the only oriental leader of a free State to have attained that eminence. And as such, he is looked upon by the people of the East as their accredited representative. Do Roosevelt¹ and Churchill, therefore know how disastrous will be the consequences of this step on the East generally? A great opportunity has been lost of placating the people of the East through the medium of this magnetic personality, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek!

Where there was the possibility of world unification, there is now the spectre of disruption and another war!

Where there was the possibility of eradication of colour-bar, the vexed question has been brought to the fore!!

Where Asianism and Westernism (Europeanism and Americanism) were about to merge, the gulf is widened, the cleavage is unbridged and once again the East and the West are kept apart !!!

Along with this, the theory of the superiority of the White Race is kept up and therewith the question of colonial possessions of the Euro-American powers in the East is side-tracked. What does the dropping of G'ssimo Chiang Kai-shek, the President and the uncrowned King

¹ Since writing this President Roosevelt has unfortunately departed this world.

of China, mean? What are the forces working behind the ghastly step? What changes in the political thought of the day have taken place? What moves in the sinister diplomacy have been made? What will be the effect of this?

The people of the East have been set thinking. Their thoughts at the moment are not on Berlin. Let the Russians reach Berlin from the east. Let the Allied Armies similarly reach Berlin.

These do not concern the people of the East. Their thoughts are not on the approaches of Berlin. They do not care whether Germans are defeated or whether the Allies are winning at every step. These do not concern them directly. To them these events are only newspaper readings.¹

Thoughts of the Oriental Peoples

But what concerns them most is the FATE that awaits them when Berlin is subdued or Tokio is destroyed. To them the question of questions is whether the stranglehold of the Euro-American powers on the countries of the East is to cease or not. To them the question is whether the colonies of the Euro-American powers in the East are to retain the same status as in the pre-war days or they are to attain the same democratic and independent status for which the United Nations are said to be fighting? Whether those colonies and dependencies will be free to choose their own governments? Whether the nau-seating plea of "tutelage" for the oriental people in democratic forms of government will be continued to be made

¹ Since this was written Germany has surrendered and the Allies have occupied Berlin.

in the post-war period? Whether nations even like France and Holland, who remained conquered for some time and are now being liberated by others, will still ask for the return of their power and authority over their eastern possessions? Whether the Euro-American powers will still continue to possess the conquered countries of other peoples in the orient when they are asking Japan to give up all her conquered territories in the same region? If Japan is to give up Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and all the rest of the territories conquered by her since 1895, then, is France to retain Indo-China, Holland to retain East Indies, America to retain Philippines and other Pacific Islands, and Britain to retain India, Burma and Ceylon? If Japan is to give up the territories belonging to other peoples and conquered by her—and she should give them up—then why should not the other powers be asked to give up the territories conquered by *them*? There cannot be one law for Japan and another for the Euro-American powers? There cannot be one policy for the orientals and another for the occidentals. If there *is*, this war is being fought in vain. Or is this war being fought for maintaining the stranglehold of some of the Euro-American powers over the oriental territories as well as in Europe and America? Then, all the tall talk of "democracy", "equality", "four freedoms" and "independence of weaker people"—Britain and France, and later United States of America, are said to have gone to war for maintaining the principles of democracy in the world—is hollow, humbug and impelled by self-interest only.

These and allied questions are troubling and haunting the people of the East. Every intelligent person amongst them has become thoughtful and inquiring. He is brood-

ing over the events. He sees the trends but does not find enough guidance. He gropes in darkness but does not find enlightenment. He sees Poland sacrificed to Stalin. He sees the refugee Polish Government in London which was nursed there for the last five years since 1939 being cheated out of existence in the twinkling of an eye.

What then is to happen to the peoples of the East? What is to be the *denouement* of the tragic drama wherein Chiang is being made to look the villain of the piece—it is too ominous to forecast now. But the outline of things to come is already tinged with gloomy foreboding.

Postscript:

New Japanese Cabinet

(Since writing the preceding pages about two months back, another Japanese Cabinet, the Koiso Cabinet, has just fallen, and a new one headed by Admiral Baron KanTro Suzuki has taken its place on April 9, 1945. There will be a lot of speculation about the moves and activities of this new cabinet. I would therefore reproduce here my interview given to some of the Bombay and Poona papers soon after the new Cabinet was formed.—K.B.V.)

“That the new Japanese Cabinet although headed by a Navy Officer, will forthwith sue for peace is too early to predict. I am not inclined to believe that the Cabinet which includes war-seasoned generals with several years of war in China and other theatres to their credit is formed with a view to surrender” says Mr. K. B. Vaidya, former Editor of the *Canton Daily Sun* and *Canton Truth* and

author of *Where Will Japan Move Next?*, *Secret of China's Resistance* and other books on the Far East, in an interview'."

"Any cabinet that includes Generals Hata, Sugiyama, Anami and Dohihara—the Lawrence of Manchuria—is not expected to capitulate without struggle. They are all stormy petrels of Japanese Militarism. Hata and Dohihara have been responsible for the seizure of most of China's territories and Manchuria respectively. Perhaps their policy will be just the reverse of surrender and they might intensify war activity against Britain and America, trying at the same time to keep Russia pleased through the Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. I am surprised why two or three other outstanding Generals like Itagaki, the conqueror of Hangchow and Hsuchow, Matsui the conqueror of Shanghai and Nanking, Nishio, the conqueror of the interior of China, and Furoso, the conqueror of Canton are not included. Perhaps they are reserved for field work", says Mr. Vaidya. "Only Admiral Yonai may be meant to be used for asking for peace, as the Japanese Navy men are considered pro-British and pro-American'."

"It may further be noted that the Cabinet contains more army men with experience of China war on the mainland. This is a pointer. Thereby Japan apparently expects to fight the last and fiercest battles on the mainland of Asia, that is, in China, Manchuria, Korea, Indo-China and Thailand. The Japanese know that the Japanese islands proper cannot be defended for long and would be isolated. Owing to the narrow and limited area of the islands forming Japan proper and due to the naval and air superiority of the Allies, the Allied air and naval attacks

can be concentrated on Japanese islands with destructive effect. The Japanese may not therefore hold out long despite intensive precautions for the defence of the home country. So unless Japan decides to capitulate, which is possible when Russia actually enters the war against her, the real fighting can be staged on the mainland of Asia which would give the Japanese ample space to spread the fighting in various theatres. Thus, the Japanese will concentrate mainly on land war than on the naval. Their greatest weakness will be in aeroplanes and tanks for land war. Ultimately oil will beat them'."

"Perhaps they expect the colour war to begin as soon as the war in Europe ends. For that the mainland of Asia will be the battleground'."

"Asked about the strength of Japan, Mr. Vaidya said that 'the total strength of the Japanese army is not less than 8,000,000 men whatever figure other observers may give. She has perhaps more than 12,000 aeroplanes of which half may be fighters. But it is the smallness of the aircraft that may be her defect. As to the navy, Japan must still be possessing about 15 battleships, 75 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 125 submarines and about 25 aircraft carriers. But these naval figures are more tentative than actual because it is so difficult to get any reliable information of the Japanese buildings owing to the extreme secrecy preserved. And hardly any Japanese spies disclosing information about their country can be found'."

"'As to Russia'," (continued Mr. Vaidya) one would only expect her to be a non-belligerent ally of Britain and America in their fight against Japan. Short of actual fighting Russia may do all she can to help the Allies and

thereby irritate Japan. Stalin has perfected a technique for recovering or grabbing territories by making others fight. He did so by the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 with Germany whereby Hitler started fighting against Britain and France, and Stalin helped himself to territories in Europe. He would do actually the same in the Far East while Britain and America are fighting Japan. Why should he shed Russian blood when he can recover by mere threats of assistance to Allies, all former Russian territories and concessions in the Far East like Port Arthur, Dairen and the southern half of Sakhalin which Japan had seized after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5? Stalin may cause ample irritation to Japan by demand after demand on crucial occasions. He would thereby either get what he wants or force Japan to make war on Russia. But I do not think that Stalin would himself declare war on Japan or that he would even give an ultimatum to Japan for such a war. Short of these, he would do everything that would compel Japan to agree to his demands, so that Japan can prosecute the war against Britain and America. It is to the interest of Russia that Britain and America continue fighting Japan when Russia is free from the European War. By remaining aloof from the Far Eastern War, Stalin will strengthen his position at San Francisco. If he becomes a belligerent in the Far East, he will be on a level with Churchill and Roosevelt and cannot get more than others. But if he is in a key position of apparent neutrality, he can get more from Japan as well as from Britain and America during the continuance of the war and in the course of peace negotiations which Stalin may even set on foot', concluded Mr. Vaidya". (12-4-1945).

HOW STRONG IS JAPAN?

Since in the above interview, I have referred to the strength of Japan, I reproduce herebelow a sketch about Japan's military, naval and air strength (including Air Suicide Squad) prepared last year (September, 1944) in connection with my writing elsewhere. The figures arrived at are more or less estimates based on various facts and figures published in various places and also on the observations of the writer as well as those of others. They need not however be taken as exact. The sketch as then (1944) prepared is as below:—

"Japan's position today is definitely critical. This is true even if one discounts to some extent the newspaper reports about the defeats of Japan and the victories of the Allies.

The Japanese have been fighting for nearly 14 years since 1931 on one sector or another in China, and all over the Pacific and the Far East since 1941. However brave they may be, the ennui of war must ultimately overtake them. Their small resources are scattered over an area that extends from the Solomon Islands to India, and from Vladivostok to Andamans. They have of course got the richest territories under their control, like the Philippine Islands,¹ Java, Borneo, Moluccas, Malay, Straits Settlement, Indo-China, Thailand and Burma with several other islands, nearly one-third of China that counts and the whole of her Pacific seaboard, Manchuria and Korea. But the territories other than China, Manchuria and Korea have been brought under control only after 1941, excepting Indo-China which came

¹ Now only part of Philippines.

under the Japanese control in 1940, yet hardly five years. During this short period the industrial fabric could not have been built up so as to be of use in war. Factories producing up to date aeroplanes and tanks cannot be constructed overnight. Men necessary for such factories cannot be trained in a month. Men for the air force cannot be drilled in a week. And when fighting is going on in all sectors, the destruction of aeroplanes and therewith of men is bound to be great. The Japanese are very brave people and their capacity for sacrifice for their country is unmatched. The Japanese soldier is variously described as "ferocious animal", a "fierce fighter", "a man who never cares for life and fears no consequences" and so on. This may be true. The fighting instinct is so much ingrained in them that even in sham fights and manœuvres, they often start regular fighting even amongst themselves. And yet there is a limit to everything. One cannot say that every Japanese soldier from amongst the Reserves is of this type. The "regulars" may be as described above. But all Reservists may not be credited with similar qualities. It is possible that such "fierce" regular soldiers are reserved for the greatest emergency. This may be true from what happened in China. In the war in China for the most part only men of secondary fighting capacity were used. But after fighting broke out in 1941 all over the Pacific and the Far East, many of the "regulars" must have been used in various sectors of war. It was known that the best soldiers, between 25 and 35 years of age, were reserved for Russia on the Manchurian and Korean borders, as well as for home defence. Excepting for the latter, the ranks of the "regulars" else-

where must have been partly depleted. And even if they are intact, how long can they last in the fierce fight that might ensue? It is true that a large army numbering about 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Japanese is operating in China and that army will give fight wherever its units are stationed. Consequently, even if the Japanese are defeated at home, fighting may still be continued in China if in the meantime Japan does not agree to evacuate from China under pressure from Russia. And the greatest, fiercest and most bloody battles will ultimately be fought on the mainland of Asia in the North and Central China and in Manchuria and Korea apart from those in Japan proper.

It is also true that the Japanese army has been intact for the most part. In the whole conquest of the Far Eastern areas during 1941 and 1942, Japan must not have lost more than 300,000 to 500,000 men. This is putting the casualties at the highest. Actual figures must be less. And not more than 1,000,000 men, perhaps fewer must have been lost in all the Chinese battles since July 1937. Some may consider this also a very high figure. Actual loss may be less. Another 1,000,000 men may have been disabled. Thus not more than 2,500,000 men including those lost and disabled in the Pacific War might have been lost to Japan after July 1937. It will be improper to put this figure any higher. The probability is that the actual figures are lower. Japan's strength may however be taken as being reduced by 2,500,000 men since 1937.

I had estimated in 1937 Japan's total strength as 8,000,000 soldiers, reserves and regulars put together. That figure was disputed then, and some others put it between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000. The latter estimates were wrong just as their estimate for economic resources were wrong

and were made by a few optimists who had erroneously anticipated Japan's early collapse. But later on in December 1941, Churchill admitted that Japan's army was about 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 strong. Taking therefore 8,000,000 as our basis, it may be seen that this army must have been reduced by 2,500,000 men. But Japan's population has been increasing by about 1,000,000 every year since 1921, of whom we may deduct 50 per cent. as female population. Thus there is a net yearly gain of 500,000 men. And every year about 500,000 men must be reaching the military age (18). Military training is compulsory for all men. And therefore, every year the potential military strength is increased by about 500,000 men. Even if we leave out some as being unfit for military service, a safe figure of 300,000 men may be taken as an yearly increase for the Japanese army.

Thus since 1937, there must have been an increase of 2,100,000 men, that is, during 7 years till 1944 at the rate of 300,000 men per year. In 1945 another 300,000 men will be added. This increase not only maintains the figure of 8,000,000 but may even add to that figure, and thereby compensate the loss which is estimated above at 2,500,000. Japan's army even today must be put at 8,000,000 men or thereabout. Of these, 1,500,000 men must be in China, Manchuria and Korea. About 500,000 in Burma; and about 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 in Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Java, Borneo and Philippines. Thus, about 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 men are outside Japan, and about 4,000,000 must be in and around Japan and in southern islands.

Added to this the non-combatant men may be put at about 3,000,000 as an adjunct of the regular army. This army consists of Koreans, Manchus, Formosans as well as

average Japanese. In emergencies they may be employed for fighting. Although their spirit and desire for fighting may not be on the same level as those of the Japanese, this army which is used for various services behind the fighting forces, can be counted upon to some extent in times of emergency.

It can therefore be reasonably concluded that so far as Japan's military strength is concerned, she has the preponderance over the present (1944) Allied strength in the Far East. But this balance will be upset only when the war in Europe will be nearer to a finish or actually over. In the meantime, we can take Japan's present strength for granted as above.¹

However, wars in these days are not fought alone on the man power of a belligerent. Air force and naval strength are essential for success. And the side that can display superiority in these directions will ultimately win the war.

Herein lies Japan's weakness. Her naval strength is great indeed. She can call more than 15 battleships ranging from 30,000 to 45,000 tons each. She has several aircraft carriers, probably about 15 to 25. Her flotilla of cruisers, destroyers and submarines is quite imposing. And it can be assumed that Japan had already acquired by 1941 the 5:5:5 ratio with Britain and America by continuous building since 1935 when she repudiated the Washington and London Naval Agreements. So, as a single power, she had probably placed herself on a basis of equality with Britain and America.

¹ Since then Germany has surrendered in Europe and the Allies are free to deal with Japan alone.

Be that as it may, the combined naval strength of Britain and America after the war in Europe is over will be more than a match for Japan. Both British and American fleets have not suffered so seriously in the war with Germany. Nor has the American fleet so far suffered serious damage in the Pacific in the three years of war with Japan. On the contrary, America's Asiatic fleet must have been ready by the end of 1943. In 1939, America started to build up an Asiatic fleet as strong as the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets individually are. Formerly there was only "the Two Ocean Navy". Now there must be the "Three Ocean Navy", the third ocean being the Indian Ocean. Thus, America must have now at its disposal three fleets, all equally large. The Pacific and the Asiatic fleets can be called in for action against Japan after Germany is finished. The strength of the Asiatic fleet will be equal to practically the whole of the Japanese fleet. But with the addition of the British fleet, and whatever small fleet that Australia can sail, the preponderance of the Allied fleets over Japan cannot be questioned. To this can be added parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets of America which combined will dwarf Japan's fleet to a pigmy.

Then about air strength. Herein lies Japan's greatest weakness. Before 1937, Japan's monthly production of aeroplanes hardly exceeded 100 a month. This productive capacity must have been increased five-folds. Some may even put it on the most optimistic basis as ten-folds. Several German technical men were left in the Far East after the European War. They were helping Japan. Thus, the average productive capacity of Japan at present may be put at about 500 to 1000 planes a month. An

optimist alone might put it at 1,000 a month. It is safer to take the other figure of 500. The total strength of the Japanese Air Force before 1937 was put more than 3,000 aeroplanes. To this may be added about 22,000 planes, built during seven years since 1937. We may assume that the rate of 500 planes a month or 6,000 per year may have been reached only in 1944, gradually after 1941 when Japan got the resources necessary for such construction. Before 1944, the development must have been gradual and could not have been at the rate of 500 planes a month or 6,000 per year. Prior to 1941, it must have been much less, but most probably greater than 100 a month in 1937. Thus we may put down here a graduated production something like the following:—

Year.	Production of planes.			
1944	6,000
1943	4,500
1942	3,500
1941	2,500
1940	2,000
1939	1,800
1938	1,500
				21,800

This total of about 22,000 may be added to the initial figure of 3,000 planes said to be possessed by Japan in 1937. Thus the total strength of Japan's air force would have been today as 25,000 planes if none were destroyed in the meantime. We may also grant that since 1938, all

the planes produced are for military¹ and naval purposes and very few or none at all for civil purposes.

And thus the total strength would have been 25,000 aeroplanes of all descriptions.

Out of these, Japan must have lost on an average at least between 1,000 to 1,500 planes per year since 1938, if we were to believe the newspaper reports. Actual losses in the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 must have been much less as no fighting on wide scale took place in these years. But since 1941, the losses may have been greater than 1,000 to 1,500 per year. So after 1941, we may put the figure as about 2,500 to 3,000 per year or thereabout. Thus we may calculate as below:—

Year.	Aeroplanes Lost.			
1938	1,500
1939	1,500
1940	1,500
1941	2,000
1942	2,000
1943	2,000
1944	3,000
				—
	Total.		13,500	—

Out of the total of 25,000 aeroplanes therefore, a balance of about 11,500 must be left at present at the disposal of Japan, after deducting the loss of 13,500 aeroplanes from the total produced till 1944. . .

¹ In Japan there is no separate Air Force as in England which has the Royal Air Force. Separate Air Units are attached to the Army and Navy, and each maintains and controls its own fleet of aeroplanes as required for its purpose.

Now as to the Air Personnel. In 1937, this was put at about 50,000 men, of whom 25,000 formed the "Death Squad" or "Suicide Squad". With the growth of the air strength, the personnel must have been increased too, and in 1944, the air personnel would have been about 250,000 men at the rate of about 10 for every plane including the ground staff and reserves. Of these, about 50,000 to 60,000 men must be pilots and bombing men. Men in the factories are not included in this estimate. Thus if all of the men were alive today, then about 250,000 to 300,000 men would have formed the air personnel for about 25,000 aeroplanes. But we have seen that Japan must have lost about 13,500 planes in seven years since 1937. Let us take on average two men lost with every plane. Thus about 27,000 to 30,000 men must have been lost since 1938. The figure of lost men cannot exceed two or three per plane that is, of those who actually pilot planes and do the bombing. Although, therefore, the total figure may be 10 men per plane for all purposes, the figure of actual men lost in fighting should not be more than two per plane on an average. Consequently, Japan's total strength of Air Personnel should be about 250,000 to 300,000 because she might have made up for the lost pilots. Her pilot strength must be about 100,000 (including reserves) of whom about 40,000 to 50,000 must be forming the "Suicide Squad".

A word about this Suicide Squad.

Only Japan can perhaps form such a squad on a large scale.

This squad is composed of the finest and toughest of airmen in Japan. A very rigid test is enforced for selection

to this army wherein the reward for every airman is certain death. The age qualification is between 20 and 30—the best age for the purpose. Airmen who have put in at least about 10,000 hours in the air are made eligible for selection. From amongst them, the best are picked, especially those who are experts in acrobatic piloting of planes. After selection, further intensive training is given to the candidates, and at the end of the training there is further test. Those who pass in the final test are selected for the Squad. They are paid at least five times more salary than other members of the ordinary air force. Their families are provided for after the death of such members of this Squad.

And the Japanese airmen consider it the greatest and proudest honour to be selected for this Squad, wherein certain death for their country is their most valued reward !

Each member of the Squad is allotted one small monoplane with two bombs and the airman pilots the plane straight into the object to be destroyed. This plane is first carried by a big plane through the air as near the object as possible, and from thence on the plane is released like a parachute, and the airman in the monoplane then pilots the plane directly to the object to be hit and dashes against it. The bombs are exploded, and the object is hit and therewith the pilot is destroyed. The plane contains only as much gasolene as is necessary for the passage up to the object to be destroyed. So, there is no possibility of the return of the airman even if he wishes to do so. The "Prince of Wales" and "Reliance" must have been hit by such bombs on December 9, 1941 in the beginning of the Pacific War.

The same is the case with human torpedoes discharged from battleships or destroyers. These torpedoes are released from warships and the pilot conducts them to the enemy ships which are then hit. There is no chance of missing the ship nor of the torpedo pilot returning. He conducts the torpedo directly to the ship, the torpedo explodes after dashing, and therewith the ship is hit and often destroyed together with the torpedo pilot.¹

This Air Suicide Squad had about 25,000 men in 1938, and this figure must have been at least doubled. And today there must be at least 50,000 men in this Squad with the necessary planes. The Japanese hope to destroy any large enemy fleet by means of this Squad when they approach within the inner radius of Japan, that is, within 500 to 700 miles around the main Japanese Islands. They will not use the Squad at longer distance as far as possible. By employing this Squad nearer home, they will have two advantages: (1) nearness to their base when longer flying is not necessary, and (2) the enemy lines will be so far stretched all over the Pacific, and reinforcement cannot be easily brought. And even if they are brought, such reinforcement may be subject to Japanese attacks nearer home. The glowing example of Admiral Togo is before them. He chose his own place for the destruction of the Russian Fleet in the Straits of Chishima in May, 1905. The advantage gained in drawing the famous Baltic Fleet of Russia nearer home was obvious. So, if

¹ It may be interesting to relate in this connection that when these torpedoes were to be tried and tested, the Japanese Government wanted three young men to risk their lives. So an advertisement appeared in papers once only for men who would risk their lives and court certain death in the trial. Within 48 hours after the advertisement appeared, more than 20,000 applications were received by the Government for the three "suicides".

the Japanese succeed in alluring the Allied Fleets nearer home, the danger point is increasing; because not only is there the air danger, but the danger from mines in water nearer their home islands is also present.

The Japanese antidote against the super fortresses and fast bombers of America and Russia are some of their smaller fighters planes of lesser speed. This is an apparent paradox. But, the reality is as it is. These smaller fighter planes, have pilots trained in acrobatic piloting. So, when a fast super bomber or fortress approaches to attack in full speed, the smaller and less speedy planes can just perform one acrobatic feat and go under the fast moving plane. The faster plane cannot control the speed and turn so quickly, and it will go at least 3 or 4 miles further in two or three minutes before it can turn round to fight. In the meantime the Japanese fighter plane can be ready to shoot at the approaching plane from below where the bigger plane can hardly swoop so swiftly when turned back to fight. The Japanese thus expect these acrobatic pilots of their smaller plane to perform deeds which the bigger ones cannot easily do. We do not know whether the Japanese have already tried this method as well as the Suicide Squad in their fights with the American air force during the last two years since Coral Sea battle (May, 1942). Perhaps it may be reserved for the greatest emergency as a sort of secret weapon.

Thus, although apparently encompassed on all sides by the American and British forces on the sea, and with the perpetual danger of Russia threatening her on the land, Japan has her own remedies ready to meet emergencies and the patriotic Japanese populace will not fail to give a

stiff fight to the last even in the face of defeat. They will go down under while fighting and cannot easily be conquered. Even after defeat, they will not easily be subdued. Japan's greatest threat is from Russia. She may minimise the danger from the combination of Britain and America after the European war is over. While the latter two have to bring their supplies and men from afar, the former has just to shift from the border of the Japanese-occupied territory into the territory itself. And so far as Russia is concerned, it can be seen that almost every Japanese city of importance is within the bombing range from Vladivostok that is, within a distance of about 500 to 700 miles only. The Russian submarine fleet is said to be stationed in the Far Eastern waters—a fleet of about 100 submarines—and this is another danger to Japan on the seas. Thus, militarily the Russian danger is close; and both the naval and air dangers are knocking at the very doors of Japan. These factors, may drive a chill in the heart of Japan. Japan therefore, has been straining every nerve to please Russia since September 1939, just as she was trying to please America before that date.

Russo-Japanese Pact

In 1939, there was to be a choice between Russia and America, and Japan chose the former. Thereby, Japan followed the lead of Prince Ito who was in favour of the Russian alliance in 1902 while Baron Okura, the then Prime Minister, was in favour of alliance with Great Britain, and accomplished it. But, this time Russia is headed by a more cold-blooded diplomat in the person of Stalin, and he has blessed the Russo-Japanese Pact of

September 1939 (consummated in 1941) to serve his own ends and not for the benefit of Japan. He knew that by his pact with Japan, the latter would be fighting Britain and America in the Pacific and thereby he would be free to operate as he pleases in China and the Far East generally, just as he knew when he made the Pact with Hitler on August 21, 1939, whereby Germany would be fighting France and Britain and thus he would be left free to operate in Europe as he pleases. This situation has been created by the Pact. And Stalin will not fail to avail himself of the opportunity. Thus the effect of the present Russo-Japanese Pact will be exactly the same as it would have been if the Russo-Japanese Pact were accomplished in 1902, that is, partition of China into respective spheres of influence. In the present situation Stalin might, as a preliminary step, agree with Japan to establish respective spheres of influence in China, instead of asking Japan to clear out bag and baggage from China, Manchuria and Korea. Japan may not easily agree to it unless very hard pressed by America and Britain. But if she can only successfully resist these two, then Russian demand will not be pitched so high as to ask Japan to clear out of China. Stalin would be content with acquiring "spheres of influence" in China jointly with Japan. And he would wait for another opportunity for further encroachment in China. Japan, in any case, will be left weak after the present war. And Stalin will then be in a position to dictate to Japan from time to time as it would suit him to do so. This will gradually lead to world domination by Russia, if Russia can build up a strong navy in the meantime."

APPENDIX

CHINA'S CHIANG

(The Vernacular translation of a part of this article in the Marathi language was broadcast by me from the All India Radio Station in Bombay on February 15, 1942 when Marshal and Madame Chiang Kai-shek were in India. A part of this article was also published in English in the "Bombay Chronicle Weekly" on February 22, 1942.—K.B.V.)

Chiang Kai-shek !

That Tower of Strength of China and one of the greatest soldiers of Asia in modern times !

What is this Strength of China? What is this personality? What are his aims and aspirations?

Maligned by some as Dictator, extolled by others as Saviour, Chinese audiences stand up in reverence and fill a theatre with loud applause at the sight of his picture in a news film. Foreigners make compelling and respectful obeisance. His mere illness used to cause fluctuations in the Shanghai and other Chinese markets, and even now affect Chinese bonds in the London market. Neither the most brilliant strategist nor the bravest soldier, nor the most ruthless Dictator, nor the greatest political genius, China's Chiang cannot be credited with any of their qualities in a superlative degree. There are in China greater strategists like General Pai Chung-hsi or General Chu Teh. There are braver soldiers like General Tsai Ting-kai. There are greater politicians or diplomats like

Mr. T. V. Soong or Mr. Quo Tai-chi. And yet this thin, dreamy, ailing man has remained supreme in China's affairs for over 16 years.

Since the Sino-Japanese War which began on September 18, 1931, eleven Cabinets¹ came into power in Japan of which ten fell. But Chiang has been the supreme head of the nation both before and after the "incident" and his power and prestige are growing. He is as much known in the world as Gandhi; and when China's armies had to retreat and to suffer reverses in the face of the Japanese invasion, Chiang's influence increased in inverse proportion to the losses and defeats. Even in his temporary retirements or during his "political illness", he wields even greater influence than when in office and creates a void which no other leader can fill. He is persuaded to return to Office.

He does not know a single foreign tongue, and yet, there is a stream of visitors from foreign lands. He has not travelled abroad, and yet he is conversant almost with every phase of national activity in other countries. His followers adore him; his friends admire and extol him; his enemies fear him and yet inwardly respect him; and those who come to "scoff remain to pray". Many tried to oust him from power but were themselves ousted. He has filled almost every important post in the National Government of China from the President of the Republic to the head of the Military Affairs Commission; and even when he is as now merely the Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and the President of the Executive Yuan,² he

¹ Now, thirteen cabinets (till April, 1945) of which twelve fell.

² Since resigned, but is now the President of the Republic of China.

is the sole power in China whose word is law and whose wish, the policy of the State.

What then is this Enigma of China, this unassuming, sober and genial looking soldier who has neither the ruthlessness of a super Dictator, nor the non-violence of Gandhi?

The answer is the man's aims, mission and work.

Chiang Kai-shek was born in the village of Chikow in the Fenghua District of the Province of Chekiang in 1887.

He was apprenticed by his parents as a shop Foki (lowest class of assistant); but he soon got tired of his job and ran away from his place to find a menial's job in the army. There he learnt to read and write, and started his military training. Later he graduated with honours from the Paoting Military Academy coming out as the top boy. He was deputed by the Manchu Emperors to Tokyo Military Staff College as a State scholar in 1907. There again he distinguished himself in Military Science by graduating with honours in 1909. But he continued to stay in Japan till 1911. While in Japan he came in contact with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Founder of the Chinese Republic, who was then organising his future revolution in China with the help and cooperation of Japanese friends.

On returning to Shanghai in 1911, he organised a people's battalion on modern lines which was later augmented into a brigade. With his help, Dr. Sun Yat-sen partly succeeded in reducing the growing influence of Yuan Shih-kai in 1915 who was then trying to crown himself as Emperor of China instead of remaining as the President of Republic.

For a time there was a period of inactivity for six or seven years, and Chiang often retired to his native place, engaged in business and again in military life until 1923.

But these years were not spent in vain. Those were the years given to the most intensive study of China's problems as a true revolutionary would do. His master's (Dr. Sun's) mission was before his eyes. And it is perhaps during these years of pondering over China's destiny that he laid the foundation of his future policy for his country.

In 1923, he came to Canton where Dr. Sun Yat-sen had his headquarters. Chiang had his first opportunity here to serve his master and his country. The Governor of Canton, Chen Chung-ming, had ousted Dr. Sun from Canton and had withdrawn to a strong fort at Waichow. Dr. Sun was anxious to punish this recalcitrant follower of his; but all his attempts failed before the Walled City of Waichow which is surrounded by water on three sides. Chiang Kai-shek volunteered his services, and with an army of 10,000 men trained and disciplined by him, stormed the citadel by getting his men to swim through the marshy waters and drove away the rebel Governor. The deed is one of the bravest in China's modern history and Chiang lost nearly 9,000 out of his 10,000 men.

His fame and name were established and he became the Chief-of-Staff of the Generalissimo, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He was soon sent to Moscow to study the Soviet organizations and military science. He returned to Canton in 1924 with Comrade Borodin and he founded the Whampoa Military Academy 12 miles from Canton. This institution, which has trained practically all the officers for

China's army in modern military methods, is a standing monument to Chiang's credit.

On March 12, 1925 Dr. Sun Yat-sen died and his mantle fell upon his trusted lieutenant, Chiang Kai-shek, whom Dr. Sun had named "Chiang Chung-Ching" (Chiang, the Central Figure No. 1).

The situation in the country was none too bright nor optimistic. The course of revolution was not moving smooth in North China where the feudal warlords like Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Tuan Chu-jui and others were continuing in their own anachronic methods of misrule and despotism. It became therefore necessary for the revolutionists to chastise them, and Chiang was requested to undertake the punitive Northern Expedition. He started on this all-important mission in August, 1926, carried everything before him, and before February 1927 established the National Government at Nanking. He rehabilitated the vast territory extending northward and eastward about 1,000 miles each way in the meantime. Later in 1928 he proceeded further north and accounted for General We Pei-fu who took shelter in the Japanese concession of Tientsin, and for Chang Tso-lin who fled to Manchuria where he was later killed in a train smash. In 1930, he defeated the combination of the "Kuomin" (National) Generals, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General and Yen Hsi-shan.

Chiang Kai-shek, whose courtesy name is "Chieh-shih", thus succeeded for the first time in eradicating anti-republican elements from the country, and paved the way for the establishment of a true Republic in China.

In 1929, he was elected as the President of the National Government from which position he retired for a time into seclusion on December 16, 1931, so that a reconciliation could be brought about between the Cantonese and Nanking sections of the 'Kuomintang' (National People's Assembly) which is the central Political Party in China like our Indian National Congress. The whole country could thus be united in meeting the Japanese invasion of China which began on September 18, 1931.

But his retirement into seclusion was not his destiny. He was wanted for the National struggle—the only man who could save the country at a critical juncture. His influence, his work, his organizing power were more brought home to the people by his absence from the political field than when he was in it.

The differences between him and his political colleagues at this stage were over China's policy towards Japan. It appears that while other politicians were for strong action, Chiang was not willing to precipitate a war with a major power like Japan without full preparations ahead. The revolution had not yet come to stay; the rehabilitation of the country was to be achieved; industries had to be developed; the navy had to be constructed; the army was to be modernized and equipped with latest weapons; aeroplanes, tanks and ammunitions had to be built up, and thus a general advance in the political, economic, military and social structure of China had to be made before one could think of throwing a challenge to Japan. Perhaps—and this is a feeling lurking in some minds—his affiliations in Japan, his association with those Japanese who helped the cause of revolution, and perhaps his desire to avoid war with an Asiatic nation to the last, were also partly resp-

onsible for his apparent lack of enthusiasm to resist Japan at that time and in the years which followed up to 1937.

It is either due to this cause or to other causes mentioned earlier, that during the course of the Sino-Japanese War from September 18, 1931 to July 7, 1937 Chiang's policy was to "wait and see", and yet to prepare for the final onslaught at a future date. He worked ceaselessly in the country, but openly acted as the "Umbrella Man"¹ did at Munich in 1938 to gain time. He followed this Fabian policy all along in this period.

In the meantime two events in 1936 had led to unity in China. In the month of July of that year, the eternal tangle between the North and the South, that is, between Nanking and Canton, was solved, when Field Marshal Chiang Kai-shek brought the five southern provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow and Fukien under his sway by quelling a rebellion led by the Kwangtung and Kwangsi warlords (Generals Chen Chai-tang, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi). In the following December, Chiang was kidnapped by his own Commanders acting in collusion with the Chinese Communists at Si-an, and before he was released, a promise is said to have been taken from him to stop fighting the Chinese Communists and to direct the joint energy towards Japan. Any way, after his release the anti-Communist war practically ceased, and later when the Sino-Japanese hostilities were resumed in July, 1937, Mr. Miao Tse-tung and General Chu-teh made common cause with him.

¹ The late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, former British Prime Minister (from 1937 to 1940) who always used to carry his umbrella everywhere, came to be jocularly called as "Umbrella Man".

These two events of outstanding importance in China which achieved unity, created conditions desired by Chiang and emboldened him to take action. Even then after the initial skirmishes since July 7, 1937, Marshal Chiang was pondering over the situation fully in the cool heights of Kuling for about two weeks. Were the people ready for the final onslaught? Were they war-minded? Would they stand the strain of a protracted war? Were the preparations adequate to the task? Those were the questions, that he must have been ruminating over, during those two *crucial* weeks; for he issued no statements, he made no pronouncements, he gave no orders to the Army to march and he did not even call his army or political chiefs for the conference until 10 days after July 7.

Then, suddenly on July 19, 1937, the headlines flashed in the newspapers of the world.

"Withdraw your soldiers from China within 48 hours". addressed to Japan.

The determination was made, the die was cast, the challenge was accepted this time, the invasion was to be resisted, orders were given to the army, the country was to be mobilised and Chiang's cry resounded throughout the world.

"We shall fight to the bitter end and ultimate victory will be ours".

To these words and to this determination he has stuck through thick and thin. On these words he has fastened his country's destiny and the course of the revolution. To these words he has attached the *car* of China's nationalism. By these words he has resuscitated and regenerated the entire Chinese Nation.

The test of a leader lies in his power to draw his clan or community or country on a critical occasion out of the mire of despondency or disgrace to a position of hope and prestige. Chiang did this in October 1938. In that month China lost both Canton, the centre of South China, and Hankow the centre of Central China, within one week, Canton on October 21 and Hankow on October 27. The whole Chinese people hung down their heads in shame. To them all appeared lost.

It was at this hour of humiliation that Field-Marshal Chiang Kai-shek rose to his full height, asserted himself and boldly convinced the people that it was only the first stage of the war. And in the second stage only, could the Chinese resist as the mountainous terrain of the country was favourable for defence.

Even his German Military Advisers were reported to have planned for him the strategy that he should not give any serious battle east of Hankow and Canton, and if necessary even these cities should be abandoned. He broadcast his speeches, made statements through newspapers, carried his message to the masses through local organizations, and within three weeks he entirely changed the complexion of things. Despondency was gone; there was no sense of shame, but instead came new vigour, new courage. That vigour has increased day by day; that hope is nearer fulfilment than before; that courage has been redoubled—redoubled despite the absence of old comrades like Wang Ching Wei.

Chiang proved himself to be the leader par excellence !

War is going on. He is encircled on all sides except the thin line of the Burma Road on the World Map.¹ Aeroplanes attack his capital and territory almost daily. Though sympathised with by many yet receiving relatively little practical help from them, this "ploughman plods his weary way" to victory in his own classical style. The future course of events is in the womb of destiny: but when the proudest nations of the world like France tumbled down before enemy onslaughts after two weeks' of fighting, **Chiang of China** even after losing a part of his territory and even when undergoing untold misery, pestilence and starvation, has still been fighting for over fourteen years.

This is the emblem of his leadership! This is his organization! This is the fruit of the reconstruction of China on National lines with a re-orientation of things to suit modern times. This is the result of his 30 years of revolutionary life to serve his master and his country.

Marshal Chiang is essentially a visionary and an idealist. He abhors violence and would avoid it if he could help it; but if needed, he would not stop at any limit in violence to gain his objects. He is simple and modest;² and in the New Life Movement introduced by him in

¹ Since this address on February 15, 1942 even this line is gone, and the Assam Road has taken its place but only partly. Later this road is also partly freed (1945).

² A story is told of Generalissimo Chiang's modesty in India. While in India he wanted pay his respects to Mahatma Gandhi at Wardha but did not consent to invite Mahatmaji to Delhi to meet him, because Mahatmaji is older than him and a respected world leader. So he wanted to go to Wardha himself. But, it is said, the Government of India did not think it safe that Chiang should visit Wardha involving a train and motor journey. So, ultimately they met in a neutral place in Calcutta in the Birla Park.

China, he has tried to harmonise the traditional virtues of China with the requirements of the modern social and political life of China.

In history there is hardly any equal to him, except Alfred the Great of England, or Peter the Great of Russia. Frederick the Great of Germany, or Shivaji the Great of India. Hannibal, Alexander, Caesar, Gengis Khan and Napoleon were great conquerors indeed; but beyond their names and personal glory they have left nothing behind. They were not great administrators, nor great statesmen, nor great diplomats. Therefore the institutions founded by them died with them.

But Shivaji the Great of India was up at the top in all these spheres. His name still inspires and is embedded in the hearts of his followers even today. His land revenue system and his initiation of the cabinet system, his strict military discipline, his desire to protect his people, his skilled diplomacy, his political wisdom, his administrative genius, his remarkable skill in strategy and strategems, the permanency of his institutions, and his power of organisation and of inspiring his people, are now matters of history. Great conqueror and military leader that he was, as great if not greater than Alexander, Napoleon, Caesar or Gengis Khan, Shivaji was equally great in all the other qualities enumerated above which these other conquerors mostly lacked. While Shivaji possessed all the energy and zeal of these conquerors, he possessed the administrative genius of Akbar. In strategems to get out of difficult situation in war and diplomacy, Shivaji excelled every great conqueror or leader of the world, past or present.

I see these qualities of a world leader re-incarnated in Field Marshal Chiang Kai-shek to a very great degree.

The unbounded optimism and tenacity of purpose of these two great men of Asia, their irrevocable faith in their country's salvation as also in their own power to achieve the same, have carried them onward to glory. The task before both of them was the same, that of the freedom and unification of their Motherland. They had to reconstruct from the very bottom to gain their objective. They did not succeed to a throne that was ready prepared for them. They had to struggle hard for it.

I might go further and say that they are the only two greatest Soldier-Statesmen in history.

Field-Marshal Chiang Kai-shek is perhaps the modern reincarnation of Shivaji the Great !

